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CHAPTER ONE 
AIM AND OBJECTS 
This µaper attempts(l) to examine both the family and citizenship 
laws of Malaysia and how they are closely inter-related either directly 
or indir ctly to each other . Due to their close inter-relationship , it 
is therefore thought the title " Interaction of Citiu·nship and Family 
Laws of Malaysia " is the most appropriate in the circumstances . Being a 
Malaysian myself, it is observed that not many Malaysians really appreciate 
that the problems of one will almost certainly affect another . A marriag 
of a citizen to a non - citizen is a good example of such interaction . 
This is made more complicated by th existence of the cosmopolitan type 
of Malaysian citizens with various cultures , traditions and religions 
which are treasures of Malaysian historical development . 
History also dictated and moulded substantially the presenL 
constitution affecting both question of citiz nship and family laws. 
It is in hwnan nature to see only the present without understanding the 
vast . Thus dissatisfaction amongst citizens of Malaysia in those areas 
is mainly due to their inability to understand and a1~reciate fully ci1c 
political-legal set up of the counlry flowing from their ignorance of 
historical development and lack of legal knowledge in such matters . 
Such problems affecting th family law (hence citizenship 
problems) were recognised by the Government dS rl·al problems which 
resulted in th enactment and on March 1 , 1982 the enforc ment of the 
Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 to streamline the laws of 
marriage and divorce amongst non-Muslim citizens. Though still in an 
infant slagc, it is hoped Lhat the Act will improv' family law affccLing 
such citizens . It is a law which abolishes 1'olygamous customary marria<_Jes 
and recognises only monogamous marriages and by section 4(2) , it 
rAW UR,tW 
VICTORIA umvrnsn y OF Wf lllNGTOO 
( 2) 
"converts" the then existing polygamous marriages into monogamous . 
With the above introduction , the objects of this paper can 
therefore be listed as: 
(1) To briefly trace the historical development of citizenship 
in general . The approach will be philosophical. 
(2) In relation to (1) above , how Malaysian citizenship 
evolved. This traces from pre-British influence till the present day 
constitution. The approach is mainly historical . 
(3) To identify the various types of marriages and divorces 
recognised by Malaysian law and related matters thereto . This will 
provide a basis for u nderstanding the interaction of citizenship and 
the family law. 
(4) To find out the real problems of the family and citizenship 
laws and how the court deals with such problems . This will directly or 
indirectly illustrate how their interaction has some bearing on human 
needs and wants. 
(5) To summarise the paper in the form of conclusion and if 
possible to make practical suggestion(s). 
(3) 
CHAP 'ER TWO 
INTRODUCTION 
[A] Philosophical Approach of 
State and Citizenship 
Th o u gh man is born naked , he is clothed with the c ustoms and 
?entions by which his life is so largely controlled ; man is a 
social c r eature . He is ever ywhere env eloped with traditions and culture 
~he course of his association with society around him and this affects 
cho~ce of valu es which i n t urn imposes upon him many restraints as 
\,e l l as p r ovidi n g him "'i th priv ileges . The consideration of the most 
t d f d 1 f h . h k . ( l) d por a~: an u n amen . o uman wants is w at J . S . Mac enzie term 
as the "study of valu e~ Accor ding to the learned author , Socrates was 
the first who emphasis j the idea of "valu es" by urging that one can only 
properly understand human life by asking what is best for him in relation 
to his wants and needs . One cannot always definitely determine how he 
is to feel in a given situation since his feelings occur without any 
choice o~ his part and often the result may be contrary to his choice. 
It will be appr opriate for me to say that marriage is certainly 
one of such examples flowing from the feeling which sometimes resulted 
contr ary to o ur choice . A man may come to know a lady not with a view 
to marriage , but contrary to their respective feelings and possibly 
choices , they still end up in marriage . (
2
) Marriage in turn will aff 3 ct 
the parties ' status with definite rights and oDligations . 
In human life , one finds not merely an effort to escape from 
conditions that are unsatisfactory to him b u t a positive endeavour to 
create better conditions directed towards higher values . The search of 
the same , is what the abov author termed as "pursuit of valu es ." Ta.king 
(4) 
the above example of marriage , it necessarily follows that if the 
said couple finds that their marriage does not satisfy their wants , they 
will endeavour to escape from it by way of divorce or separation . 
Whether their endeavours materialise or not , is the area where the law 
takes its proper place . 
In family life , personal affection is the primary bond . As one 
grows up in a family , he g r adually learns social obligations to other 
individuals . The aggregate of individuals and family groups forms a 
simple village community , co-operating with one another to a certain 
extent but with little sense of loyalty . In Greece , units of human life 
were considered as cities . Then individuals were of little importance . 
Cities were rather civic centres . The modern conception of citizenship 
was the result of some people, notably Socrates , who emphasised personal 
contacts with his fellow-men that life in the city was made possible and 
not just civic centres as Greeks generally took them to be . 
However , it was the Romans who introduced the notable change in 
the general conception of citizenship . To the Roman world , a man might 
be a Roman citizen without ever seeing the city . If he was a Roman 
citizen , ·then he belonged to a great nation (Roman Commonwealth) which 
had gradually built up a definite code of laws . 
'l'oday most people think of the particular nation t.o which thvy 
belong as that to which their ultimate loyalty is almost entirely due. 
The general contention according to Plato is that human beings would 
prefer to pursue their own individual self- interests withoul restraint 
b ut find by experience that in such a condition they suff r more than 
they gain and consequently hav, lc·d tlwm to entc.;r in o aqret'mL·11t to 
submit to certain restraints for the sake of security . 'l'he needs of 
h . 1 d . . . . ( ) ( J) b · sue security resu te in constilutions or ap ropriatc Acts eing 
( 5) 
drawn up which govern the rights and obligations of citizens with 
the ultimate aim of achieving "common good ." 
In searching for better values , one is exposed to factors like 
religion , economic , political, culture and the like which directly or 
indirectly affect the choice of citizenship. Since marriage affects the 
status of those concerned , it is submitted that it will, in certain cases, 
involve the choice of citizenship . The choice mav not be due to our 
feelings or sense of loyalty to the state but dictated by the circum-
stances of the case relative to human needs. It is therefore a fair 
inference to say that there is a close relationship between citizenship 
and family laws in the light of our p ursuit of values. 
[BJ Brief Historical Development of 
Malaysian Citizenship Law 
Since the concept of citizenship is a gradual his lorical develor;menl 
of human needs and submission to definite code of laws for the sake of 
. - . ·11 b . . h l . ( 4 ) . · h' security, it wi e appropriate to examine ow Ma aysian citizens ip 
law evolved . 
Since the fourth cenlury , Malaysia was under the influence of 
Hindu and Buddhist religions , tradition and cul lur , brou9h t by Indian 
merchants who came to Malaysia in search of gold and spices . A living 
relic of their political influence can be seen today in the system of 
( 5 ) 
"sultanate states ." However the legislative powers of each state 
are now vested in the State Legislalive Assembly_ For tlw Federation, 
(6) 
they are with the Malaysian Parliament with the Yang Di Pertuan Agong 
as the Supreme Head of the Federation under the present system of 
constitutional monarchy. 
(6) 
Traditionally and culturally a lot of present day Malay 
custom and tradition were inherit~d from the Indian Hindus. Malay wedding 
ceremonies are essentially Hindu by tradition . Under the Hindu-Buddhist 
Indian influence , the Malays then were either Hindu or Buddhism by 
religion . 
Towards the end of the 13th century , Arab trad rs came to 
1 . . d . 1 ( 
7 ) Ma aysia intro uciny Is am to Malaysia . They managed to influence 
( 8 ) 
the Malay sultans . In the early 15th century , Megat Iskandar Shah 
became a Muslim . (
9
) His subjects (the Malays) , following his example , 
also converted themselves to Muslims . The position of the Sultans 
under Islamic influence was also enhanced . Islam was accepted by the 
subjects as their official religion. During the reign of Sultan Muzaffar 
Shah (1446 - 59 A . O.) of Malacca, th e whole of the Malay population were 
Muslims . 
The first European interest in Malaysia was exhibited by the 
Portuguese when they decided to control the spice trade in South East 
Asia. Thus under the leadership of Alfonso de Albuerque , Malacca 
was captured by the Portuguese . They ruled Malacca until the Dutch 
took over in 1641 . Both the Portuguese and thr• Dutch , later the 
British , were responsible for the introduction of Christianity to 
Malaysia , thus the concept of Christian monogamous marriage and the 
like are the impact of their influence . 
The British interests in Malaysia were primarily commercial and 
developed Lhrough the British East India Company. In the late 18th 
century British settlements wer estublished in Penanq and Singapore . 
Since Malaysia was and is rich in tin ore , there was an influx 
of Chinese from China at about that time in search of forture . They 
were employed as tin- miners then owned by the Sultans and their 
(7) 
dignatories . Prior to that , the Malays were the tin-miners . The 
Chinese too , like others , brought with them their tradition and cusLoms , 
one of which was polygamous marriage which is still practised and 
recognised by Malaysian law until this day . 
The Chinese were also employed by the British planters in sugar 
cane and coffee plantations . However , due to the demand of sugar and 
coffee in European markets , the British had to employ more labourers to 
meet that demand. Due to the British long established trade and political 
relationship with India , they could easily overcome the labour shortage 
by bringing Indian labourers to Malaysia , and due to Her geographical and 
historical factors was fo u nd by those Indian labourers to be a suitable 
country to work and later settled permanently in Malaysia. 
When the price of coffee dropped in the 1890s , the British 
d . d h b (lO) . d b . d . h iverte tote rub er in ustry y opening an or converting t e 
estates then existing to rubber plantations . They found out that the 
Indians were best suited to work in those rubber estates . As the result 
of that , more Indian labourers were brought into Malaysia by the British, 
beside the then existing ones . There was thus a steady flow of Indian 
immigrants to Malaysia between 1850 till 1904 of an approximate number 
of 20 , 000 Tamil Indians a year. They came through Penang and were sent 
to various British estates situated throughout the west coast of West 
Malaysia . The Indians too brought along with them their culture and 
traditions which at one time dominated Malaysian society during Hindu-
Buddhist influence pointed out earlier. 
In the early 1940s, the Japanese occupied Malaysia . During 
their occupation, they put an end to all immigrants during that period . 
The succeeding governments thereafter have carefully controlled the flow 
of immigrants . Hence when the British ruled Malaysia after the Japanese 
(8) 
(11) 
occupation , they were faced with the issu e of "Legal Status " 
due to the presence of var iou s races , both the Malays and those 
immigrants and their descendents . That confrontation resulted in the 
(12 ) . 
Federation Agreeme nt 1948 being drawn up . 
Delicately b a lancing the rights and interests of major groups 
(the Malays , Chi nese a nd I ndi a ns ), a cons ti tution was drawn up 
incorpor ating the 1948 Agr eement . Under the Agreement , each Malay Sultan 
was expl icitly guar ant eed the "prerogat i v e , power and jurisdiction" which 
they had enjoyed p r ior t o the Japanese occupation . Islamic religion 
falls within tha t ambi t. Prov isions were also made for special educational 
t raining fo r the Ma l ays t o e nab l e them to maintain their position in the 
sphere of polit ics and a dministration . 
f · · h · ( l3) . . . h. f d In matters o c i tizens ip , a u tomatic citizens ip was con erre 
t o those who habitually spoke Malay language and conformed to Malay 
c ustoms rather than the place of birth or residence . 
(14) 
Thus all Malays 
who were then subjects of Malay rulers automatically by law became 
Malaysian citizens whereas the non- Malays (the Chinese and the Indians) , 
even if born in a Malay state , had to apply for citizenship . However , 
th l . . h ub . b . h . l ( 1 5) ld e non- Ma ay Britis s Jects orn in t e Straits Sett eme nt cou 
a l so opt for Malaysian citizenship , but not oth e r s . Thus the net effect 
of the 1948 Agreement was to accord l egal status to the differences 
already existing in the population and to mak e e thnicity a political issue . 
When the Federation achieve d He r indepe nde nc e on 31 August 1957 , 
most of the above matters we re re-affirme d in He r constitution . Islam 
was made a state religion with freedom of worship guaranteed to all 
non- Muslims . The State Religious Councils we r e e s tablished in each state 
and were made (and still are ) autonomous in all matters of religio us 
rulings , doctrines and subject only to the authority of the Sultans of 
(9) 
each state. Special privileges of Malays and the use of the Malay 
language as the national language of Malaysia were also entrenched 
in the Constitution . 
[C] The Present Law Affecting Citizenship 
Before discussing the problems facing Malaysian family law 
and the interaction with the question of citizenship , it is necessary to 
look into Her present day citizenship law . However, it must be noted 
that in doing so , it is only intended to discuss citizenship law in 
general and not an in-depth examination of constitutional matters 
which is beyond the scope of this paper . 
Citizenship matters are now governed by ~art III articles 14-31 
read together with the First and Second Schedules of the Constitution. 
Citizenship can be acquired by one of the four ways: 
(a) operation of law (article 14); or 
(b) registration (articles 15-18); or 
(c) naturalisation (article 19); or 
(d) incorporation of territory (article 22). 
Article 23 of the Constitution deals with renunciation of 
citizenship. Loss of citizenship by deprivation by the Federal Government 
(hereafter referred to as "the Government") is provided by articles 24-28A 
of the Constitution . Doubts as to the question of citizenship could be 
resolved by the Government in accordance with article 30 , ibid . 
The First Schedule of the Constitution deals with the oath to Le 
taken by those who acquired Malaysian citizenship oLher than by operation 
of law. Basically , it requires such persons to give absolute and full 
(10) 
allegiance to only Malaysia and to His Majesty the Yang Di Pertuan Agong. 
. 1(16) . . h' Malaysia does not recognise dua citizens ip. 
The Second Schedule (Parts I and II) deals in detail with the 
acquisition of citizenship by operation of law both before and after 
Malaysia Day which is 16 September 1963. (l
7
) Sections 17-22 of Part III 
of the Schedule are interpretation sections which include, inter alia, 
the manner in which the period of residence is to be calculated. 
Thus it can be clearly seen that Malaysian citizens by operation 
of law are those people who , by virtue of the Constitution, are citizens 
without volition on their part, without a choice in the matter by the 
Government and without taking oath or (in most cases) formality. On the 
h h d · (lS) f 1 . . . h h 1 . . ot er an, wives o Ma aysian citizens w o are not t emse ves citizens 
of Malaysia, must take the oath of allegiance before they can be 
registered as Malaysian citizens under article 15(1) of the Constitution. 
[D] Domicile 
P. Weis(l
9
) pointed out that "Nationality" is frequently used 
with "citizenship" but said that there is a definite distinction between 
the two terminologies. "Nationality", according to him is the delimitation 
of personal jurisdiction while "citizenship" refers to legal relationship 
of a person (citizen) to the state. He concluded by saying that "every 
citizen is a national, but not every national necessarily a citizen of 
(20) 
the state concerned." 
(21) 
"A national", according to joint authors Cheshire and North, 
represents a political status by virtue of which he owes allegiance to 
some particular country, while "domicile" indicates civil status and it 
(11) 
provides the law by which his personal rights and obligations are 
determined. "Nationality" (other than acquisition by naturalisation) 
depends on the place of birth or on parentage; domicile, on the other 
~and, depends on residence in a particular country. 
A person may be a national (or citizen) of one country but 
domiciled in another. Bromley and Webb(
22
) pointed out that domicile 
has nothing to do with nationality. A man must have a domicile at any 
one time. While it is true that a person cannot be without a domicile 
(23) at any one time, he can still be a stateless person. 
Whatever the view may be, it has now been accepted that domicile 
can either be one of the three types, namely: 
(i) Domicile of origin; 
or (ii) Domicile of choice; 
or (iii) Dependent domicile. 
In this context, Malaysia follows the same common law rules of domicile. 
It is worth noting that since "intention of permanent residency" 
is the test for acquiring domicile of choice and the acquisition of 
Ml . . . h' b . . (24) d 1· . (25) 1 a aysian citizens ip y registration an natura isation a so 
require the same test, it is therefore submitted that an acquisition of 
domicile of choice of Malaysia should be a strong ground for consideration 
of an award of Malaysian citizenship to such a person. 'l'he second point 
that can justifiably be inferred from the concept of domicile is in 
relation to married women. Since a woman's domicile will be that of her 
. (26) husband's, it is perhaps one of the prime factors why special passes 
are given to wives (who are not Malaysian by birth and or foreign 
citizenship) of Malaysian citizens by the Government of Malaysia. 
(12) 
CHAPTER THREE 
FAMILY LAW IN MALAYSIA 
[A] Marriages 
(i) General 
Due to Malaysian cosmopolitan society, both polygamous and 
monogamous marriages are recognised in Malaysia. Professor Ahmad Ibrahim 
wrote, "marriages can be validly performed in Malaysia under either 
customary law or statutory law. In the former case the law recognises 
the peculiarities of religious opinion, custom and rites as practised 
by the cosmopolitan society of the Malaysian peoples, and upholds their 
l •d• 1 • II (1) va 1 ity as a mora necessity. The recognition of various types 
of marriages as stated by the learned author has a lot to do with the 
very nature of Malaysian history pointed out earlier and needs no 
further repetition here. 
This chapter is therefore intended to look into the law of 
marriages in Malaysia generally in order to understand the problems 
facing Her family law. 
(ii) Polygamous Marriages 
Chinese polygamous marriage is esseBtially based on custom. 
Hindu law and custom allow Indian Hindus to also contract polygamous 
marriages. Even though they are allowed to do so, some Hindus in 
Malaysia have accepted monogamous marriage to be their customary rule 
as in the case of Paramasuri v. Ayadurai [1959] M.L.J. 195. ( 2 ) Malay 
(13) 
marriages are governed by Islamic law. 
. . 1 · ( 3) Islamic law permits a Mus im 
to contract a polygamous marriage but imposes a limit of four wives at 
any one time. 
The Chinese customary (polygamous) marriage is based on publicity 
(4) 
and the only legal requirement is that the marriage must be consensual. 
On publicity, it is best to quote the words of an expert on Chinese 
customary law and accepted by court as such, (S) when he said, 
"The chief ingredient is that marriage must be an 
open affair known to friends and relatives 
alike, ... " (6) 
Though Chinese customary law prohibits marriage between persons of 
certain relationship which not only makes it an offence(
7
) but also 
. d b . . . (B) h . . f. . d . d voi a initio, t ere is no speci ic gui ance, pointe out 
Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, (
9
) both from the law or customary usage as to 
matters such as prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity, 
minimum age and consent of the parents or guardians. What can clearly 
be inferred is that the consent to marry is strictly a matter between 
the parties involved. This, it is submitted, could be subject to abuse 
by those who can influence the other party (the weaker one) to give the 
necessary consent to make their intention of cohabitation public because 
of his position, power or financial standing . The last situation is 
evidenced by the fact that most polygamous marriages (in fact ) involve 
successful businessmen. I think I am not wrong to say in such circumstances, 
"money can buy a rich Chinese businessman wives." 
In Malysian Chinese society, though Chinese customary marriage is 
polygamous in nature, the vast majority of the Chinese contracted such 
marriages not because they want to take more than one wife but basically 
to conform only to the wishes of their custom and traditions. 
Islamic religion in allowing its followers to contract polygamous 
marriages discourages Muslim males to take more than one wife unless he 
(14) 
(a) has the financial capability of supporting his wives and children 
and (b) is able to do justice to all his wives by being able to treat 
them impartially. On polygamous marriage, the Holy Koran says: 
"And if you fear that you cannot act equitably towards 
orphans , then marry such women as seem good to you, two , 
three or four , but if you fear that you may not do 
justice to them , then marry only one . " [4:3] . (10) 
The above verse was revealed to Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) 
after a major war where a lot of men were killed leaving behind widows 
and their orphans. The rationale behind it, it is submitted, is to 
permit , but not encourage, those who were capable of maintaining several 
wives to marry those widows and thus become guardians of the orphans. 
It would also reduce the sufferings by those widows and orphans as the 
result of the demise of their loved-ones and possibly prevented them 
from following immoral paths to earn their living. In practice, very 
few Muslim males take more than one wife. Since religious conventions 
cannot be changed to suit human needs , Islamic marriage will remain to 
be polygamous in form. Again it must be stressed here that most of the 
Malaysian Muslim males contracted Muslim polygamous marriages not for 
the purpose of taking more than one wife but to obey the command of the 
religion. Legal problems will only surface if a person us es Islamic 
religious marriage as a platform to take several wives for reason(s) bes t 
known to those individuals concerned . Such problems will be discus s ed 
later. 
Unlike any other forms of monogamous marriages, Muslim women are 
well guarded against abuse in that, no Muslim woman, regardless of her 
age , is able to give herself to marriage without the consent of a "Wali" 
(guardian for marriage). Such consent must be given either by her faLher 
or grandfather or male relative (patrilineal side) in the absence of 
either her father or grandfather. If the consent is unreasonably withheld 
(15) 
. (11) 
or impossible to obtain, then she can apply to a "Kathi" (a Muslim 
"judge") for the same. The religious "dos" and "don'ts" act as strong 
barriers for most male Muslims from taking more than one wife. 
(iii) Monogamous Marriages 
The concept of monogamous type of marriage as accepted by English 
(12) 
law was defined by Lord Penzance in Hyde v. Hyde when he said, 
"I conceive that marriage, as understood in 
Christendom, may ... be defined as voluntary union 
for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion 
of all others." (13) 
Lord Penzance's definition of monogamous union is clearly the Christian 
concept of marriage. Since quite a large proportion of Malaysian citizens 
h · · (l
4 ) h h . . . d" 1956(l5 ) abl are C ristians, t e C ristian Marriage Or inance en es 
. (16) . (17) 
monogamous unions to be performed in churches. The essentials 
of a valid marriage under this Ordinance are substantially the same as 
those in the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952. 
The Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952, promotes the principle of 
"one man one wife". It caters for monogamous marriage of all except 
Muslims. Under this Ordinance, a couple who were married under their 
personal law could be subsequently married again, if they so wish, under 
the Ordinance, provided that neither of the parties is, at the time of 
marriage under the Ordinance, already married to a third person and do not 
offend any of the provisions affecting the validity of a marriage. The 
effect of this subsequent marriage under this Ordinance, it is submitted, 
is to convert a potentially polygamous marriage by the parties' personal 
law to a monogamous one as defined by Lord Penzance in the case of 
Hyde v. Hyde, supra. It is further submitted that, that is so since 
once married under the Ordinance, a ~erson will no longer be capdble of 
(16) 
contracting another valid marriage with another person during the 
continuance of the marriage . Similar provisions are enacted under 
the Church and Civil Marriages Ordinances of Sarawak (Sarawak Cap 92). 
It is worth noting that notwithstanding the fact that marriages 
under the Christian Marriage Ordinance 1956 are monogamous, it has been 
held in Re Loh Toh Met [1961) M. L.J . 234 and Re Ding Lo Ca [1966) 2 
M.L . J. 220, that there is nothing in the Ordinance to prevent a Chinese 
Christian from opting either to contract a monogamous marriage under the 
Ordinance or a polygamous marriage in accordance with his or her personal 
law . 
[B] Divorces 
(i} Polygamous Marriages 
Both polygamous marriage and divorce to Chinese are based on custom 
and rites. To Muslims, the law of divorce is in accordance with Islamic 
principles. Divorces in respect of polygamous marriages can be divided 
into: 
(a} that of customary marriages; 
and (b) that of Muslim marriages. 
(a) of Customary Marriages: 
. (18) 
According to Lee Siow Mong , there are seven grounds for divorce. 
Divorce , however, must be made publicly known. In Mary Ng & Anor. v. 
' ' (l 9 ) h d h' h I h , Ooi Gim Teong, t e respon ent went to is mot er s ouse to inform her 
of his clear intention to divorce his wife by Chinese customary law on 
23 May 1970 whereby a gathering of the respondent's mother, grandmother, 
two uncles and an old family friend was held on the 24th May 1970 . Also 
(17) 
present at that gathering was his wife's godfather. At that gathering 
the respondent made the necessary public announcement in the presence 
of all those stated above. He also notified by registered letter 
dated 7 May 1970 to his wife of his intention of divorcing her. Her 
solicitor was also notified on the 10 June 1970 by the respondent. In 
other words, the respondent's intention to divorce his wife by Chinese 
customary law was made abundantly clear . On the question of publicity, 
after accepting the expert evidence of Lee Siow Mong, Mr Justice 
Mohamed Azmi said , 
"The real essence of this practice is that the divorce must 
be made publicly known ... so long as the divorce and the 
grounds for it are made publicly known it is sufficient. 
The cardinal rule is that it should not be made a secret .... 
What is important is that publicity as to the intention 
and the fact of divorce must be given [with publicity] 
II (20) 
Thus so long as the divorce is made public, it is valid according 
to Chinese customary law and will receive recognition by the court in 
Malaysia. There is no need of any application to be made to the court 
except in Sarawak. In Sarawak an application must be made to the High 
Court for such a divorce. 
(b) of Muslim Marriages: 
. (21) 
Under Islamic law (as recognised in Malaysia) a marriage 
contract may be terminated by legal action taken by the husband or by 
the "Kathi" which can take place in one of the three ways: 
(1) at the will of the husband unilaterally; 
or (2) by mutual consent; 
or (3 ) by judicial decree through annulment or dissolution. 
. (22) 
Under fil, the husband can divorce his wife or wives by "talak". 
1£ said once, then the parties could, during the 100 days of "edah", (
23 ) 
(18 ) 
. (24) 
" roJok" b ack the marr i age by r evoking the " talak". Duri ng " edah", 
the divorced wife is forbidden to re - marry another mal e Muslim . This , 
it is submitted inter alia , due to the husband ' s right of "rojok " and 
perhaps forms a "cooling- off " period since " talak " may have taken 
place in the midst of t he temper. However , if "talak " is said thrice 
in succession , then the husband cannot "rojok " his marriage again as 
stated above . 
There shoul d not be any probl em under ( 2) since both the husband 
and wi fe must consent to the divorce , except in a situation where the 
wife is being forced to g i ve such a consent . 
The wife h a s t he right to ask fo r a divorce u nder (3 ) on the 
husband ' s medical o r moral grounds or on grounds of failure to maintain 
her and the children of the family , desertion or imprisonment . The 
moral injunction against divorce is contained in the prophet ' s (peace 
be upon him ) say i ng , " Divorce is the most hateful to God of all permitted 
thi ngs ." 
The husband should only exercise his right of divorce when a 
s i tuation is such that he can no longer live in peace and harmony with 
h i s wife . Abu Hurairah relates that the prophet (peace be upon him) 
sa i d , "The most perfect of believers in the matler of faith is he whose 
behaviour is best ; and the best of you are those who behave best tow<1nb 
their wives ." (Tirmidi) . 
(ii) Monogamous Marriages 
. ( 25) ( 2(,) 
In West Malaysia and Sabah the grounds for the dissolution 
of marriage for either of the married couple arc : 
(a) adultery; 
(b ) cruelty; 
(19) 
(c) unsound mind; 
(d) desertion for a period of at least three years preceding 
the presentation of the petition. 
In addition to the above, the wife can also petition if she can show 
that since the solemnization of the marriage the husband has been found 
guilty of: 
(a) rape; 
or (b) sodomy; 
or (c) bestiality 
or (d) taking another wife 
(27) 
In Sarawak , the grounds for the dissolution of marriage are: 
(a) adultery; 
(b) sodomy; 
(c) wilful desertion for two years without just and 
reasonable cause; 
(d) failure to support the petitioner and the children of the 
marriage under eighteen years of age for six months or more without 
just cause; 
{e) cruelty that has caused substantial physical and mental 
suffering to the petitioner; 
(f) has for three years preceding the petition been insane; 
(g) is an incurable habitual drunkard of such nature as to 
endanger himself or others or is not capable of managing himself or his 
affairs under such influence; 
(h) has been committed to imprisonment sentence of five years 
or more; 
(i) has been presumed dead judic ially; 
{j) has disobeyed a decree of the court for restitution of 
conjugal right; 
(20) 
(k) wilful (without reasonable cause) to have sexual relationship 
with the petitioner; 
(1) has communicated a vener8al or loathsome disease to the 
petitioner ; 
(m) suffering from a venereal disease; 
and (n) wa s at the time of marriage pregnant by some person other 
than the petitioner . 
It is to be noted that bigamy is not one of the grounds for dissolution 
of marriage in Sarawak . 
Section 494 of the Malaysian Penal Code , specifically makes 
bigamy an of f ence p unishable with impr isonment for a term which may 
extend to seven years and shall also be liable to a fine. Thus the said 
prov ision does not apply to the Chinese Malaysian citizens who under 
(28) the present law can contract customary polygamous marriages . 
Under the present law affecting monogamous marriages , no petition 
for dissolution of the marriage can , in general , be presented within 
the first three years of the marriage. What then if one or more of the 
grounds s~ated above took place during the first three years of 
marriage? The simple answer is "wait". It is therefore suggested that 
in such a situation where the parties really and genuinely cannot live 
together anymore as husband and wife (other than by judicial separation) 
within such a period , the three years "waiting" period should not apply. 
The judge in his wisdom, can always set a "cooling-off" period as he 
thinks fit , having regard to all the circwnstances of the case , before 
making the divorce decree "nisi" to be absolute . 
f 
( 29) 
If the marriage is monogamous in orm and neither of the 
parties to the petition is a Christian , the Court may grant such a decree . 
Whether to grant such an application or not is a matter of lhe Court ' s 
discretion . 
(21) 
[c] Law Reform 
On 4 February 1970, a Royal Commission (headed by the then 
Chief Justice) on Non-Muslim Marriage and Divorce Laws was appointed 
by His Majesty the Yang Di Pertuan Agong. Its main purpose was to study 
and examine the existing laws of non-Muslim marriage and divorce and 
to determine the feasibility of reform based (in particular) on the 
resolution of the 1962 United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages. On 15 November 
1971, the Commission submitted its recommendations proposing a radical 
reform on the law of marriage and divorce to His Majesty the Yang 
Di Pertuan Agong. The proposed reform, will eliminate polygamous 
marriages among the non-Muslim population of Malaysia. The important 
features of the recommendations are: 
(a) The Commission was convinced that public opinion is 
overwhelmingly in favour of the abolition of polygamous and 
therefore recommended that henceforth all marriages should be 
monogamous (emphasis mine); 
(b) To enable the proper implementation of the reformed law 
on monogamous marriages, there must be a system of compulsory 
registration of all marriages although the customary ceremony 
(features) of marriages may still be retained; 
(c) The minimum age of the parties to a marriage are to be 
increased to 18 years for male spouse and 16 years for female 
spouse and, in addition, a person under the age of 21 will need 
parental or guardian consent before entering into matrimony; 
and (d) Divorce law is also extended in scope in that the granting 
of divorce may be made where there is evidence of irretrievable 
. (JO) 
breakdown of marriage. 
(22) 
Irretrievable breakdown of marriage will be the sole ground 
for divorce was the reconunendation of the Conunission. It can be proved 
by one or more of the facts which are as follows: 
(a) that the respondent has conunitt ed adultery and the 
petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent; 
(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the 
petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the 
respondent; 
(c) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for 
a continuous period of at least two years preceding the 
. f h . . (31) presentation o t e petition. 
In making the decree, the Court must take into account all the 
circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the parties and 
how the interests of any child or children of the marriage may be 
affected if the marriage is dissolved and may dismiss it if the Court 
is satisfied it would be wrong to grant a decree nisi (even if subject 
to such terms and condition(s) as the Court thinks fit) . Divorce by 
mutual consent upon joint petition is preserved. 
The existing rule of "no petition is to be present" within three 
years of marriage is also preserved but the period of such prohibition 
is now reduced to two years . With respect , my earlier submission on 
this "waiting period " applies here too . 
The proposed law of marriage and divorce for non-Muslims has been 
enacted and is now styled a s The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 
1976 which came into effect as from 1 March 1982 . By implementation of 
this Act, there will be no more polygamous (other than for ceremonial 
feature/purpose) marriages which will receive legal recogniLion as such 
for non-Muslims - as before 1 March 1982. Section 494 of the Penal Code 
(23) 
will now apply to Chinese too with the same force as it did to 
Christians and other non-Muslims who are not permitted by their personal 
law to contract polygamous marriage prior to the 1976 Act aforesaid. 
. ( 32) . 
The Act has no application to Muslim marriages. 
(24) 
CHAPTER FOUR 
PROBLEMS FACING Ml\.LAYSIAN 
FAMILY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS 
[A] GENERAL 
Both marriage and citizenship affect the rights and obligations 
of those concerned. The question of domicile is another factor common 
to both when legal problems affecting the rights and obligations of 
married citizens are discussed. They may be so inter-related and one 
may be so dependent on another that it is sometimes difficult to draw 
a clear distinction between their individual and actual problems without 
considering the other. 
It is worth noting that the problems in these two areas of law 
may be due to one or several factors such as cultural differences, 
beliefs, historical, political and the like in relation to human needs 
and an individual's aim to achieve what he thinks is best for him and 
possibly his family. Though such problems merit the Government's 
attention and consideration many have in reality slipped the legal 
detection of the proper aulhority. Such ex<1mples, as problems of 
Indonesian illegal immigrants to Malaysia and marriage for convenience 
will remain real and existing facts though could not be asserted and 
supported with official statistics. 
However, problems arising from polygamous mdrriages amongst 
non-Muslim Malaysian citizens <1nu residents has lony been appreciated 
by the Coverument. Due to Malaysian cosmopolitan soc.:icly and the 
differences pointed above, careful study and planning will first have 
( 25) 
to be taken before any radical change can be affected . The coming into 
force on 1 March 1982 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, 
is a clear evidence of the Government's recognition of such problems . 
It introduced radical change in Malaysian family law affect;~g those 
citizens and residents of Malaysia . 
With the coming into force of the 1976 Act as stated above, such 
problems can be conveniently dealt with as problems before and after 
1 March 1982. However, human wants and needs, discussed earlier , are 
factors which may or may not be seen on the surface but are certainly, 
it is submitted , the driving forces that caused those problems. Those 
that were not noticed were taken for granted as non-existent or because 
they failed to attract the attention of the statisticians . Further, one 
tends to emphasise only problems where non-citizens are involved at the 
expense of not appreciating the actual and real problems of a similar 
nature which also exist amongst citizens . Where it involved purely 
citizens , interaction of both family and citizenship laws in such a 
situation may not be so prominently noticed to the eyes of those concerned . 
With that view in mind , I will attempt to endeavour to show that such 
problems do exist and can be as complex as those involving non-citizens 
and thus merit consideration of this paper. 
In this chapter , I will therefore attempt to canvass some of the 
important problems faced by Malaysia in matters involving family and 
citizenship laws and their interaction with one c.tnother and the legal 
consequences flowing from them . These problems do not only come from 
citizens and non-citizens but also between citizens and citizens . In 
certain cases , I will be quoting L11e real examples and no L merely rny 
personal hypothesis by referring only to their initials . It is respectfully 
hoped that it will be appreciated why their full names is best not disclosed 
(26) 
since by doing so, it may prejudice their future and possibly the future 
of their families. Again for convenience, I propose to divide the 
discussion into problems arising: 
( 1) 
(2) 
. . d . . (1) as between citizen an citizen; 
as between citizen and non-citizen; 
and (3) as between non-citizen and non-citizen who may or may not 
subsequently acquired Malaysian citizenship. 
[B] As Belween Citizen and Citizen 
It is an obvious statement of fact to say that Malaysian family 
law is basically meant for Malaysian citizens, though not denying the 
fact that it also applies to non-citizens resident in Malaysia. As 
for Malaysian citizens both residence and/or domicile govern their 
personal law. It is in that context, it is respectfully submitted, 
that the family problems arising from the structure of Malaysian family 
law are directly or indirectly also due to the fact that they are 
Malaysian citizens. 
The cosmopolitan Malaysian non-Muslim citizens' problems can be 
justifiably classified as (a) racial, (b) customary and (c) religious. 
(A) and (b) normally overlap each other and can therefore be considered 
together. It is (c), that may really cause social and legal problems 
amongst Malaysian married citizens. Even based solely on race and custom, 
the laws for non-Malays and Malays are different not because the former 
are "second class citizens", (
2
) but the very nature of the evolution of 
Malaysian constitution which has been discussed earlier in relation to 
citizenship law of Malaysia, and because Malays who are Muslims, are 
(27) 
. 1 · ( 3) being governed by various Mus im enactments . Further various laws 
governing non-Muslim citizens exclude Muslims in matters affecting 
. . 1 bl (4 ) matrimonia pro ems. It is because of that, that such problems 
facing non-Muslim and the Muslim citizens are best considered separately. 
Where non-Muslim citizens' marriages are monogamous in form 
either under Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 (No . 44 of 1952) (
5
) or 
Christian Marriage Ordinance 1956 (No.33 of 1956) (
5
) or Church and 
.. d' ( ak 92)( 6 ) h'. . Civil Marriages Or inances Saraw Cap . or C ristian ~arriage 
Ordinance 1919 (Sabah Cap. 27) , (
7
) their problems are basically tackled 
in accordance with and similar to the principles of English law. All 
formalities and essentials of a valid marriage such as consent (where 
necessary), notice of marriage and the like must be observed in order to 
receive legal recognition . Similarly, evidence must be sufficiently 
(8) 
proved to the satisfaction of the Court that one or more grounds 
for divorce took place before a judicial decree can be granted by a 
Court of competent jurisdiction. 
The position is different in the case of polygamous cus tomary 
marriages and divorces as illustrated by the case of Mary Ng & Anor. v. 
0 
. . . (9) 
oi Gim Teonq . The facts of the case are a s follows: 
Both the first applicant (Mary Ng) and respondent (uoi Gim Teong) 
were married in PE>nang on 10 December 1967 by Chinese rites ctnd customs. 
On 20 October 1 968 , a son was born to them which caus ed the marriage to 
break down . The high point of the problems was when the respondent went 
~o his mo~her's house in Ipoh, Perak to inform her of his intention to 
divorce his wife according to Chinese customs and r i•es vi z . disrespectful 
and disobedient behavJ.uur of the first applicant to him and his mother. 
Consequent to that visit, his mother arranged a me eting which was held 
the next day (24 May , 1970). Present at that meeting were the respondent ' s 
(28) 
mother , his grandmother , two of his unc l es and old family friend and 
Mary Ng ' s godfather . At that meeting (gathering) , he made known his 
wife ' s misconduct to those present and also his intention to divorce 
his wife . He further informed the said gathering that he would make 
the said announcement public through the local Chinese newspaper which he 
did on 19 June 1970 . Also prior to that , he made his intention clear to 
his wi fe ' s solici t or on 10 June 1970. His intention was also made known 
to his wife by regi stered letter dated 23 May 1970 to her. In other 
words , the respondent ' s intention was publicly made clear and hence 
the divorce according to the facts of the case was effective. 
According to Lee S i ow Mong , both customary Chinese marriage and 
divorce are based on t he concept of "publicity ." (lO) 
In dismissing the first applicant's claim for maintenance under 
section 3 of the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Ordinance 1950 
and holding that there was publicity as required by the Chinese custorrs, 
Mohamed Azmi J said, 
" In my view ... disrespectful and disobedient behdvior 
of his wife towards him and his mother come within 
one of the seven grounds of divorce under Chinese 
customary law . " (ll) 
Lee Siow Mong pointed nut that according to the Chinese customs, 
adultery (which cannot be condoned), assulting the husband's parents and 
absconding are three grounds which make divorce a rnus l . He was of tJ1e 
opinion, though divorce appears simple to obtain according to Chinese 
customs, there are t.hree grounds which give the great.8st 1,rotection to 
Chinese women agdinst divorce, which according to him, remain unsurpassed 
in the divorce law of any country up to the most mod8rn time and they are: 
(1) if the wife has ke1- t three years mourning for ei her of 
the husband's parents; 
(2) if the husband having been once 1oor is now rich; 
(29) 
and (3) if the woman (wife) has no home to go to. 
The above assumption of his was not shared by Kenneth K.S . Wee who 
suggested that it was erroneous to do so and was of the opinion that in 
the case of Mary Ng , supra , that assumption was in fact made to the 
. (12) 
disadvantage of the wife concerned, since he doubted whether Lee Siow 
. (13) 
Mong was actually competent to speak on Chinese customs in Malaysia . 
The significance of the above discussion in respect of problems 
faced by Chinese Malaysian citizens who contracted such marriage is well 
summarised by the obiter of Mohamed Azmi J when he said , 
11 
• •• I have not overlooked the possible effect of my 
decision on the position and status of Chinese women 
in this country who have gone through marriage 
according to their personal law • 
.. . allowing a Chinese man in this modern age to 
divorce his wife for either talkativeness or disobedience 
[in accordance to Chinese customary law] would amount 
to giving thousands of Chinese husbands a gun in their 
hands . This may be so; and if the Chinese customary 
law on marriage and divorce is no longer popular and 
considered obsolete, it is for the legislature to 
make inroads into them , as has already been done in 
China . 11 ( 14) 
From the said obiter , it is submitted that the problems amongst 
citizens do really exist , otherwise his Lordship would not have made 
any reference to the "position and status" of Chinese women in Malaysia 
and hence his suggestion that some form of legislation should be 
considered to deal with such a situation . Since the origin of such 
customs came from China through Chinese migration to Malaysia (and 
subsequently acquired Malaysian citizenship), it would be a fair and 
justifiable comment to say that since China has introduced legislation 
to control such situation , as 1,uinted out by his Lorship, it is only 
proper that Malaysia too should do the same. Thus so long as the law 
affecting Chinese customary marriage is not changed, ~1ose Malaysian 
(30) 
female citizens in similar position as Mary Ng will remain to be the 
subject of such divorces . 
His Lordship ' s observation as to the introduction of appropriate 
(15) 
legislative control was shared both by Kenneth K. S. Wee and 
. (16) 
Lee Siow Mong . The latter suggested that the Government could enact 
law to make it compulsory for all customary marriages to be registered. 
By doing so , according to him, will put an end to all squabbles on 
whether a Chinese married according to custom has in fact contracted a 
valid marriage which will benefit both man and women and put family life 
on a proper footing in this modern age. 
The recognition of such problems by the Government must have been, 
inter alia, amongst the prime factors in the appointment of the Royal 
Commission on Non-Muslim Marriage and Divorce Laws by His Majesty Yang 
DiPertuan Agong on 4 February 1970 . Their efforts and recommendations 
have been crystallised into the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. 
The Royal Commission , after examining the various statute and 
customary laws on marriage and divorce of non-Muslims and after 
consideri11g testimonies of a cross-section of the people of Malaysia, 
submitted.its recommendations(l
7
) to His Majesty Yang DiPertuan Agong 
on 15 November 1971 1 roposing for a radical reform on the law of 
marriage and divorce . The Act was enacted and came into force as 
from l March 1982 . 
Looking at the Act, it appears to be a comprehensive codification 
of the law of marriages and divorces affecting non-Muslims except the 
. (18) (19) . (20) natives of Sabah and Sarawak and the aborigines of West Malaysia. 
However, such natives and aborigines may elect to be married under this 
Act and if so, they will be bound by its provisions just like any other 
non-Muslims in Malaysia . . ( 21) Muslims are not affected by the Act by 
(31) 
virtue of section 3(3) which reads, 
"This Act shall not apply to a Muslim or to any person 
who is married under Muslim law and no marriage of one 
of the parties which professes the religion of Islam 
[that is, a Muslim] shall be solemnised or registered 
under this Act; ... " 
ether than Muslims, natives of Sabah and Sarawak and aborigines of 
West Malaysia (subject to qualification above), the Act applies to 
all persons in Malaysia by section 3(1) which stipulates as follows: 
" ... this Act shall apply to all persons in Malaysia 
and to all persons domiciled in Malaysia but are 
resident outside Malaysia." 
By section 3(2), for the purposes of this Act, unless it can be proved 
otherwise, a Malaysian citizen shall be deemed to be domiciled in Malaysia. 
It is submitted that there is no way for a Malaysian non-Muslim citizen 
to circumvent the Act by contracting a marriage outside Malaysia 
according to the custom in that country which may permit polygamy unless 
he is prepared to give up his Malaysian citizenship for the sake of such 
marriage, since he will be deemed to be domiciled in Malaysia even though 
he may have been a resident outside Malaysia. 
Section 5(4) states, 
"- [After 1 March 1982] , no marriage under any law, 
religion, custom or usage may be solemnised except 
as provided in Part III." 
Part III mentioned by section 5(4) above, deals with three matters namely, 
and 
(1) R 
. . . (21) 
estrictions on marriage; 
(2) 
(22) 
Preliminaries to marriage; 
. ( 23) 
(3) Solemnisation of marriage. 
Solemnisation of marriage abroad is dealt by section 26(1) which must 
be that as conducted at the Malaysian Embassy, High Commission or 
Consulate which shall be similar in all respects to that which applies to 
. 1 . d d . d . 1 · (24 ) marriages so emnise an registere in Ma aysia. According to 
section 27, the marriage of every person ordinarily resident abroad who 
is a citizen of or domiciled in Malaysia after 1 March 1982 shall be 
(32) 
registered. If a marriage abroad is not conducted as stated by 
section 27, ibid, it has to be registered within six months after the 
date of such marriage (section 31(1) (a)) or if either or both parties 
return to Malaysia within that period, then such marriage must be 
registered within six months of arrival in Malaysia as required by 
section 31(1A), ibid. 
Thus by virtue of compulsory registration of both locally 
celebrated and overseas conducted marriages required by sections 27,31(1) (a) 
and 31(1A) stated above, all marriages abroad can therefore be identified 
as to its form. From the wording of section 5, ibid, it is clear that 
polygamous marriage is specifically prohibited . Contravention to 
section 5, is deemed an offence of bigamy under section 494 of the 
. (25) 
Malaysian Penal Code . If sanction to prosecute is given by the 
. ( 26) 
Public Prosecutor, any person who contravenes section 5, ibid, and 
upon conviction will be liable to a term of imprisonment which may extend 
to seven years and shall also be liable to a fine. From the above 
discussion, it is therefore clear that no Malaysian non-Muslim citizen 
can contract a polygamous marriage abroad without giving up his citizenship, 
hence the support to the suggestion that citizenship law does interact 
with family law in such a situation. 
As customs and usages are historical in origin and hav~ been 
accepted by Malaysian citizens, the 1976 Act does not invalidate marriages 
conducted according to such customs prior to 1 March 1982 and such 
. . . ( 27 ) h h . . marriages remain valid. Watte Act prevents is contracting 
subsequent marriages during the subsistence of the valid marriage(s) 
(prior to that date) by virtue of section 5, ibid; the marriages prior 
to that date are deemed to be registered under this Act . ( 2B) 
(33) 
Besides section 5 , ibid , the wording of section 23 of the Act 
suggests that the marriage solemnised under the Act is certainly 
monogamous both in form and in effect . The words of solemnisation 
reads as follows : 
"Take notice then that. .. you consent to be 
legally married for life to each other , and 
that this marriage cannot be dissolved during 
your lifet ime except by a valid judgement of the 
court and if either of you shall , during the 
lifetime of the other , contract another marriage, 
howsoever and wheresoever solemnised, while this 
marriage subsists , you will thereby be committing 
an offence against the law . 11 (29) (emphasis mine). 
Thus from the above , it is obvious that marriage according to 
Chinese customary custom and rites as in the case of Mary Ng v . Ooi Gim 
( 30) . 
Teong , is no more possible after 1 March 1982 . The Act provides 
that solemnisation of monogamous marriage can only be performed either 
. (31) 
at the Registrar's office or a church or temple or any other place 
· 1·d 1 · ( 32 ) · d b h · ( 33 ) as authorised by a va i icence issue y t e Registrar . If 
it is to be conducted at other than the office of the Registrar , then 
it must be conducted by either any clergyman or minister or priest of 
h h 1 · d ( 
34 ) b h · · ( 3 5 ) 1 f any c urc or temp e appointe y t e Minister. Cleary ram 
Mary Ng ' s case , supra, Chinese customary marriage (which is polygamous 
in nature) does not come within any of the above des criptions of 
solemnisation of marriage since the intended married couple do not have 
to go to the temple or church or to civil registry but only to perform 
certain custom and rites based on publicity. 
Another radical change in family law in Malaysia affecting her 
citizens is the increase of the voluntary marriageable age of both parties 
to an intended marriage to twenty-one years of age notwithstanding the 
Age of Majority Act 1971 (
36
) which provides that the majority age is 
eighteen. The Act makes a marriage void if it is contracted by the 
(34) 
. (37) parties under eighteen years of age unless with the necessary consent. 
Exception is however made for a female who has attained her sixteenth 
birthday to contract a valid marriage if the conditions laid down by 
section 21, ibid, have been complied with. In such a case, the marriage 
will be conducted under licence by virtue of section 21(3) of the Act. 
From section 37 of the Act, it is submitted that the Act must 
have appreciated the human needs and wants in so far as marriage is 
concerned in that, it makes it an offence which shall on conviction be 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine 
not exceeding three thousand "ringgit" (Malaysian dollars) or to both 
for any one to use force or threat to compel a person to marry against 
his will (section 37(a), ibid) or to prevent a person attaining his 
marriageable age from contracting a valid marriage (section 37(b), ibid) 
Since marriage, it is submitted, is an association of two persons for 
life, it should therefore be free from such force or threat. Article 10(1) 
hl of the Constitution provides that "all citizens have the right to 
form associations", which it is submitted, must have intended to include 
freedom to lo rm association in the nature of marriage as contended above. 
Sections 38-42 deals with various offences under the Act 
punishable by different maximum imprisonment terms ranging from three to 
ten years and/or shall also be liable to a fine r,.rnying from three t.housand 
"ringgit" to fifteen thousand "ringgit" or to both, inter alia, of making 
. ( 38) false declaration for procuring a marriage. 
On the premises above, it is submitted that by this Act, non-
Muslim citizens will now be more safe when they decide to get married and 
will also know more of their legal destination by virtue of the fact 
that they are Malaysian citizens. To those "thousand Chinese males that 
• ' h ' h d II ( 39) were given a gun in t eir ans the same are now being "taken away" 
by the Act. 
(35) 
So far as Divorce (judicial separation and nullity of marriage 
inclusive) are concerned, they are dealt with Part VI of the Act under 
sections 47-71. 
Under the Act, the ground for divorce petition is made uniform 
throughout Malaysia which is now based on one and one ground only, viz that 
the marriage has irretrievably broken down. (4 0) All the facts alleged in 
the petition presented should be inquired by the Court before deciding 
that the marriage has been so broken down before making a decree for 
its dissolution. In doing so, the Court should have regard to one or 
more facts as laid down by section 54(1) (a) to (d), and it would be just 
and reasonable to do so in all circumstances including the conduct of the 
parties and how the interests of any child or children of the marriage 
(41) 
may be affected. If adultery is alleged, a prayer may be included 
. (42) asking the Court that the co-respondent be condemned in costs and 
if proved to the satisfaction of the Court, it may award petitioner such 
d . h"nk f" (43 ) . h d" h f th h .. amages as it t i s it, notwit stan ing t e act at t e petition 
. th d . d. . d d. d ( 44 ) against e respon ent is ismisse or a Journe . 
Reconciliation is encouraged by the Act under section 55, and in 
every divorce petition it i s required to state what steps had been taken 
ff · 1. . ( 4 5) toe ect a reconci iatio n. Further a decree nisi, if granted, may 
be rescinded by the Court upon application by the party in which it was 
• C
45
) · f 1 · · k h d . g iven i no app ication to ma e sue ecree absolute is made by the 
said party after the expiration of three months from the earlie st date 
where an a pplication for decree absolute could have been made. 
It is to be noted that while section 48(1) of the Act limits the 
Court's power to make any decree of divorce, section 49(1) provides an 
additional jur isdiction to the Court to entertain proceedings brought by a 
wife although the husband is not domiciled or resident in Malaysia if 
(JG) 
condi ions (a) or (b) of section 49(1), ibid, are satisfied. Where the 
Court exercises its jurisdiction under section 49(1), the issues shall be 
determined in accordance with the law which would be applicable thereto 
if the parties were domiciled or resident in Malaysia by virtue of 
section 49(2)_( 47 ) 
Under matters affecting ~ullity of marriage which are dealt with 
by sections 67-75, another evidence of abolishing polygamous marriage 
can be seen in section 69(a) of the Act, which states that, 
"A marriage which takes place after the appointed date 
that is , l March 1982 shall be void if -
"(a) at the time of the marriage either party was 
already lawfully married and the former 
husband or wife of such party was living at 
the time of the marriage and such former 
marriage was then in force." 
In both divorce and nullity of marriage cases, the right of 
the petitioner to petition to Court for the same is only available if 
. (48) the marriage is either registered or deemed registered under the 
f 
(49) Act and the marriage is monogamous in orm. In addition to that, 
both the parties to the marriage must be domiciled (section 48(1) (c), ibid) 
in the case of divorce, and reside (section 67(c), ibid) for nullity 
proceedings, in Malaysia at the time of presentation of the said petition. 
However no petition for divorce can be presented before the expiration 
f . d f t f t.h d t f th · ( 5o) o a perio o wo years rom e a e o e marriage . 
In the light of discussion above, if the case of Mary Ng, supra, 
is to be decided under the present Act, it is my submission that the 
husband would not have succeeded since disobedience to him and/or his 
mother (unless disobedience to him amounted to wilful refusal to have 
. h. . h h. ) ( Sl) . a sexual relations ip wit im will certainly not fall within 
either ground (b) or (c) of section 54(1) of the Act. 
( 37) 
Unless non- Muslim citizens become Muslims, the law as it 
stands today affecting their marriages and divorces will be as discussed 
above . The legal problems will arise when one of the parties to such 
a marriage converts himself or herself to Islam during the subsistence 
of their marriage . This can happen as in the case of U. Viswalingam v. 
· 1· <52 ) h' h ·11 b d . d · d ·1 d [ J 1 S. Viswa ingam, w 1c wi e iscusse in etai un er D ater . 
For the present purpose , it is sufficient to say that a Muslim woman cun 
only marry a Muslim male while a Muslim male can marry either a Muslim 
I 
. . (53) 
female and or a "k1tab1yya ". Section 51(1) of the Act deals with such 
a situation . The section reads, 
"(l) Where one party to a marriage has converted 
to Islam , the other party who has not so 
converted may petition =or divorce : 
Provided that no etition under this 
section shall be oresented before the 
expiration of the period of three months 
from the date of co.version." 
Other than the qualification in section 51(1), ibid, the two years' 
restriction period stipulated by section 50(1) of the Act does not apply. 
Upon the Court dissolving such marriage it may make provision for the wife 
or husband (as .e case may be), and for the su_port, care and custody 
of L½e children of the marriag~. Such provision will cease to have effect 
upon such divorced spouse re-marrying another person or living in adultery 
(54) 
with any other person. 
As Muslim marriages and divorces are not in any way affected 
by the 1976 Act, the position now will be the same as before l March 1982 
so far as ~uslim citizens are concerned. 
( 18) 
[C] As Between Citizen and Non-Citizen 
This is the area which is always attracting the attention of 
both the general public as well as the Government. Their problems may be 
p urely social , cultural, religious or legal, which may affect directly or 
indirectly their r espective citizenships. The ability of a foreign wife 
or husband to adapt t o the situation in Malaysia may cause her or him to 
change her or his foreign citizenship to Malaysian. Non-adaptability to 
the same b ut for the sake of marriage, the Malaysian citizen concerned 
may give up his or her citizenship in p reference to the citizenship of the 
other party . Bringing a foreign wife into Malaysia itself may pose legal 
problems . I will first demonstrate those p roblems with two actual examples . 
My first example I will call case (L), and the second , case (S.K.). 
(a) Case (L) 
(L) was originally a Malaysian Chinese citizen by birth under the 
constitution. After finishing his sixth form in Malaysia he came to New 
Zealand and did his arts degree at the Victoria University of Wellington . 
While he was a student , he met and later married a New Zealand citizen 
named (M) in Malaysia. They first went through Chinese customary marriage 
and subsequently re-married under Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952. Thus 
by their subsequent marriage under the 1952 Ordinance as stat<=d above , 
their marriage is monogamous for all intents and purposes . It may be 
noted that in this instance, they have no problem with the immigration 
authority since (M) was given a special pass under Immigration Act 1956/63 
(Revised - 1975) because they intended to settle in Malaysia . 
To be a Malaysian citizen , (M) by her marriage to (L) can acquire 
Malaysian citizenship upon making application to be regist.ered as such in 
accordance with article 15 (1) of the Constitu tion which reads, 
11 (1) ... any married woman whose husband is a citizen is 
entitled , upon making application to the Federal 
Government , to be registered as a citizen if the 
marriage was subsisting and the husband a citizen ... , 
or if she satisfies the Federal Government -
11 (a) that she has resided in the Federation 
throughout(SS) the two years preceding the date of 
the application, and intends to do so permanently ; 
and 
"(b) that she is of good character. 11 
There was no doubt when I interviewed them, both of them wanted 
to settle in Malaysia and (M) intended to permanently reside there. 
Beyond a shadow of doubt (M) is of good character. All she then needed 
to do in the circumstances was to reside in Malaysia for a continuous 
period of two years in compliance with article 15(1) (a) of the Constitution. 
However, while in Malaysia and well before the two year period was 
up , she found out that she could not really adapt herself to the Mcilaysian 
way of life , that is Chinese custom and tradition , and decided to come 
back to New Zealand. (L) d ecided for the sake of the marriage to follow 
her to New Zealand . He then applied for a job with the New Zealand Government . 
Being a qualified man and also married to a New Zealand citizen he was 
s uccessful with his application and was offered a job with one of the 
Ministries. - He accepted the offer. His job is such that he has to take an 
oath of secrecy with the New Zealand Government and also to give his 
allegiance to the same. Since Malaysia does not recognise dual citizenship 
nd because of his marriage to (M) and his decision to be a New Zealand 
citizen, he renounced his Malaysian citizenship. 
By the very na Lure of his job , he has to travel overseas and did 
so on a New Zealand passport . While working with the New z:ealand GOVL·rnment 
he applied for hew Zealand citizenship both on the grounds of his working 
with tl1e Government of New Zealand and marriage to (M) . His application 
was granted by the Government of New Zealand and he is now a New Zealand 
citizen with two children born in New Zealand. 
(4U) 
By article 24(3A) (a) or (b) of the Constitution, the very act 
of (L) travelling on the New Zealand passport , he could , as a matter of 
discretion of the Government of Malaysia , be deprived of his Malaysian 
· · h . t · h d . h. 1 · · f h (S 6 l citizens ip no wit stan ing is vo untary r enunc1ation o t e same. 
The case of (L) clearly demonstrates how non-adaptability of (M) 
to Malaysian way of life due to her marriage to (L) has affected the 
citizenship of (L) and how (L) could acquire his citizenship of New Zealand 
due' to his marriage to (M) . Likewise it is also true with (M) if she could 
adapt to Malaysian Chinese custom and tradition. Her marriage to (L) 
gave her special right to have a special pass to stay in Malaysia and if 
she were to r eside continuously for two years since her marriage to (L), 
she has the constitutional right to apply to have herself registered as a 
Malaysian citizen as the wife of (L), otherwise she can only be so under 
article 19 of the Constitution, which requires a period of residence of an 
aggregate of not less than ten years in the twelve years of her residence 
. 1 . d. h d f h 1 · · ( S 7 ) in Ma aysia prec e ing t e ate o e r app ication. Once (M) was 
granted Malaysian citizenship under article 15 of the Constitution , she will 
r emain to be so , regardless of whether she was or was not subsequently 
divorced from (L) unless she herself volunlarily wishes to 1.enounce her 
Malaysian citizenship . 
(b) Case (S.K.) 
My interview with the COUJJle revealed the following facts. 
(S.K.), a Malaysian female citizen went to Scotland to do a course. 
While doing that course she met (B) who is a citizen of Lhe United Kingdom . 
After she wds quclli fied from the course she deci dt:d to marry (B) . They 
went back to Malaysia to be married to each other , first according to U1e 
Chinese c ustomary law followed by civil marriage under the Civil Marriage 
(41) 
Ordinance 1952, thus making their marriage monogamous in form . After 
the marriage ceremony , they both went back to Britain. Since (S . K . ) is 
married to (B) , she was given permanent resident status by the British 
Government. 
Later (B) decided to migrate to New Zealand . (S . K . ) followed her 
husband to New Zealand but still retains her Malaysian citizenship . 
After working for some time in New Zealand , (B) decided to go to university. 
Ile applied (later accepted) for admission to Victoria University of 
Wellington, while (S . K . ) is working in New Zealand . (B) applied for 
New Zealand citizenship which was later granted and is thus now a New 
Zealand citizen . (S . K . ) is at the moment given a permanent resident 
status here due to her marriage to (B) , b u t still a Malaysian citizen . 
Now she too is a student at the Victoria University of Wellington . 
From my interview with them , they told me the reason why (S . K. ) 
does not renounce her Malaysian citizenship is basically because they 
have not finally decided where to settle but indicated to me that it will 
either be in Australia or Malaysia . Secondly , since it is the policy of 
the Malaysian Government now that once a Malaysian citizen gives up his 
or her citi~enship, he or she will not be given back his or her Malaysian 
citizenship, js the very reason why (S.K.) still retains her Malaysian 
citizenship . It is therefore important for her to retain her citizenship 
~hould they decide to settle in Malaysia later . 
By reason of their marriage , it is respect.fully submi t.ted that 
(B) will almost certainly be given permanent resident status by the Malaysian 
Government should they decide to settle there. While bciny so , he can 
apply to be a Malaysian citizen under article l') of t.ho Conslitutio11 . Jn tlle 
alternative, (S.K.) can renounce her Malaysian citizenship under 
article 24(1) of the Constitulion once they have decided to finally settle 
in Australia and upon acquisition of Australian citizenship. 
(42) 
From the above two cases , a few important conclusions can be 
drawn . 
Firstly , due to (M) and (B) marrying Malaysian citizens , both of 
them have no problem in obtaining special pass and certainly permanent 
residency in Malaysia should they decide to be Malaysian citizens . 
Secondly , in the case of (L) , (M) does not have to have any 
knowledge of Malay language under article 15, ibid, since she is the 
wife of (L) , a Malaysian citizen . On the other hand, (B) must have an 
adequate knowledge of the Malay language under article 19 of the Constitution. 
The Malay language q ualification is a deciding factor of any foreign citizen 
acquiring Malaysian ci t izenship . It can therefore be argued that if the 
foreign husband could overcome that problem , his genuine intention to stay 
and treat Malaysia as his permanent residence should be in his favour. 
It is also submitted that due to the same barrier Malaysian citizens 
marrying foreign husbands tend to renounce their Malaysian citizenship 
in preference of their husbands'. It is therefore suggested that the 
language barrier in such cases should be relaxed or modified . Thus it is 
submitted (by way of suggestion) that a new article be included in the 
Constitution to accommodate such cases if Malaysia is to avoid loosing 
Her female citizens as the result of their marriage to foreign husbands. 
However, residential qualification should stay in order to avoid acquisition 
uf Malaysian citizenship through marriage of convenience. It is therefore• 
submitted that Uiere is a definite interaction between citizenship c.1nd 
family laws in these cases . 
The change of the domicile of (M) and (S.K . ) is the t..hird 
observalion that can be drawn from tJ10se two cases. By virtue of (M) 's 
marriage to (L), her domicile of origin (New Zealand) was tr>mporarily lost 
when she acquired Malaysian domicile but reverted back to her when she 
(43) 
decided to come back to New Zealand should (L) refused to follow her to 
New Zealand and there was a divorce between them. However, that was not 
the case. Since (L) decided to be and now retains New Zealand citizenship, 
her domicile as a dependent will be also that of New Zealand by virtue 
of her marriage to (L). 
In the case of (S.K.), (S.K.) 's domicile had been changed twice 
already. She acquired the British domicile when she married (B) and stayed 
in Britain before migrating to New Zealand. When (B) acquired New Zealand 
citizenship, her domicile will therefore be that of New Zealand. 
Fourthly, assuming that in both cases, while (M) and (B) were in 
the process of acquiring their Malaysian citizenship , both (M) and (S.K.) 
gave birth to a child each. In such a situation, obviously the children 
1 . . . b . f 1 ( 58 ) . th d. h are Ma aysian citizens y operation o aw, notwi stan ing t e fact 
whether or not the couples later decided to voluntarily renounce 
Malaysian citizenship or lose such citizenship by virtue of article 24 (1) 
h 
. . (59) 
oft e Constitution. 
While the case of (S.K.) may not create more problems than those 
already discussed, the marriage of (M) to (L) may do so. What will be 
the position if (M) submitted to Chinese customary law marriage to (L) 
without later undergoing the second marriage as stated above? Since ( M) ' s 
marriage to (L) took place before 1 March 1982 , it is submitted they 
. (60) will still be legally married based on Mary Ng v. Ooi Gim Teong. 
What then will be the legal position if (before 1 March 1982) similar 
circumstances as explained above took place , but (L) insisted that (M) 
should remain in Malaysia as his customary wife and (M) refused to obey 
him and still came back to New Zealand? 
Will the New Zealand Court recognise her marriage and what will be 
her legal status in relation to her marriage if (L): 
(44) 
(1) refused to divorce her? 
and (2) divorced her in accordance with Chinese customary law based 
on Mary Ng's case, supra, for being disobedient to him and possibly his 
parents? 
It is my submission that in the case of~' New Zealand Court 
will still consider (M) married to (L) since such marriage is valid in 
. (61) 
Malaysia. (M) can invoke section 27(1) (a) of the Family Proceedings 
Act 1980 (No.94) for a declaration as to the validity of her marriage to 
(L). It is also submitted that she will most likely succeed if she 
petitions for a divorce in New Zealand on the ground that her marriage to 
(L) has broken down irreconciliably under section 39(1) of the same Act. 
Though successful with her petition for a divorce in New Zealand, what 
will be the effect of such divorce decree in Malaysia? It is my contention 
that the net effect will be that though (M) is a divorced woman in New 
Zealand and thus free to re-marry another man, she will still be married 
to (L) in Malaysia. Thus if she re-marries in New Zealand and has issue, 
the issue is legitimate according to New Zealand law, but certainly 
illegitimate in Malaysia. While (M) cannot be charged for bigamy in 
New Zealar 1 in the circumstances, she is certainly liable to be faced 
with such a charge in Malaysia. 
If (L) were to die intestate, it will follow that she will still 
be able to claim interests in his estate n int0.stacy since she would be 
technically married to (L) at the time of his death without being legally 
divorced in Malaysia by (L). So far as (L) is concerned , under Chinese 
customary law he does not have to divorce (M) in order to take another 
customary wife during the subsistence of his marriage with (M). 
It is therefore submitted that any order made by thP New Zealand 
Court in respect of or incidental to a divorce petition by (M) will purely 
(45) 
be academic and will have no real practical significance in Malaysia . 
As for _8]_ , based on the wording 0£ section 44 of the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980 (Act 94) , such a divorce by (L) will certainly be 
recognised by New Zealand Court. 
The general observation of the two cases above , particularly the 
case of (L) , clearly illustrates the interaction of citizenship and family 
laws of Malaysia . 
Neither problems in (1) or (2) above will arise after 1 March 1982 
under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, since such marriage 
(62) 
will be deemed monogamous though originally polygamous . Be that as it 
may , citizenship l aw will r emain to interact with family law . 
Problems such as demonstrated by those two cases though real , 
may pass unnoticed since neither (M) nor (B) faced any complication with 
immigration matters . There can really be practical and legal problems if 
foreign wives are faced with such matters as is demonstrated in the case 
f 1 / 
. d. (63) 
o In Re Meena w o Muniyan l . 
In this case , the applicant, an Indian National , was married to an 
Indian Malaysian citizen some time in March 1960 in India according to 
Hindu rites . When she came to Malaysia she was given an entry permit . 
She was later granted a status of permanent resident by issuing to her a 
d . d . d (64) re i entity car . She stayed with her husband in Malaysia until 1~70 
when she surrendered the said red identity card to return to India , which 
according to her husband's affidavit dated 4 December 1979, was to 
accompany his mother who was mentally ill. 
In 1977, the husband applied to the immigration authority to bring 
his wife back to Malaysia. He was advised that. his wife could enter 
Malaysia on a social visit pass on an Indian passport valict for one year. 
The applicant came back to Malaysia in May 1978 issued wiU1 a social visit. 
(46) 
pass which was extended from time to time up to 28 May 1979 . When the said 
pass expired , she was issued with a special pass to enable the applicant 
to make necessary arrangements to leave the country which was extended 
periodically until 3 September 1979 . On that date , all her travel 
documents were impounded by the immigration authority and on October 26 , 1979 
she was removed to Padu Prison in Kuala Lumpur with a view to deportation 
as a person whose p r esence was unlawful u nder the Immigration Act 1959/63 
. (65) 
(Revised - 19 75) . 
The applicant then applied to Court for a writ of habeas corpu;.; 
on the grounds , inter alia , 
(i) as a wife of a ci t izen , she was entitled to remain in 
Malaysia ; 
and (ii) that refusal by the immigration authority to do so was 
per verse and il l egal . 
His Lor dship said , 
"In my opinion t her e a r e two separate q uestions posed 
... so closely i nter- connected that both have to be 
considered s i multaneously . The first is the principal 
one , i . e . whether the applicant is lawfully detained. 
The second q ues t ion is what is the form of the alleged 
right or entitlement of the applicant under Article 15 
of the Constitu tion as a wife of a citizen and the 
effect of certain provisions of the Immigration Act and 
Immigration Regulations on her ." ( 66) 
The Immigration Regulations His LordJl 1ip was referring to was 
paragra1 , , 3(1) of the Immigration (Prohibition of Entry) Order 1963 (G
7
) 
wh ich according to His Lordship sets out a number of categories of J:Jersons 
s uch as professionals or persons with specialist qualifications and those 
with a special certificate from the Minister certifying that their admission 
is i n the economic interests of the country and tl1us considered thGm as a 
special class of persons by themselves of which non-citizen wives of 
citizens are not . A wife of a citizen definitely has to apply for entry 
(47) 
permit under section 10 of the Immigration Act 1959/63 (Revised - 1973) 
without any special privileges or rights to be issued with the same . That 
being the case, since the applicant ' s special pass was cancelled as stated 
above , her presence in Malaysia thereafter would be unlawful under 
section 15 of the said Act . Thus the Order of Removal made under 
section 33(1) of the same was proper and hence her detention with a view 
to deportation in the circumstances would therefore be lawful. 
said , 
As to the rights of a non-citizen wife of a citizen, His Lordship 
"(b } the applicant is not entitled as of right. to 
an entry pe r mit to e n ter(68) or to remain(6 9 ) in 
Malaysia by reason solely of the fact that her 
husband is a citi zen . 11 (70) 
This case illustr ates problems faced by interact.ion of both family 
and citizenship matters . Since the applicant was married to a citizen in 
India , she has to register her marriage (with no time limit to do so) 
under the Registration of Marriage Ordinance 1952 before she can legally 
be sJid to have a recognised marriage and thus apply for registration as 
a citizen of Malaysia (if she so desired) by virtue of her marriage to a 
Malaysian citizen under article 15(1) of the Constitution . 
It is interesting to note that in the course of determining the 
iss ue of the case , His Lordship referred to LJ1e passage writ. ten by 
· d · ( 71 ) th . . h 1 . f. . f . . Vis u Sinna urai who was of e opinion w y qua i ications o non-citizen 
wives to be Malaysian citizens were made mo:re stringent was t:o eliminate 
t.he acquisition of citizenship by a formal marriage of convenience . '!'his , 
it is submitted should be more so, in t.he case of customary marriage bu.sPd 
on Mary Ng's case , supra , which is easy to c ntract and dissolve such c1 
marriage . It is therefore my contentioll that , such marriages of convenicnc' 
do exist as of fact though they are not able to be dtJtected and/or supported 
(48) 
by official statistics , 01...herwise it would not be referred to by the 
learned author above . 
Since marriages of citizens to non-citizens are quite common and 
the fact that human needs are such that those foreign wives may need to go 
back to their birthplace to visit their parents or for some other reasons , 
the Immigration Department , Malaysia , issued a special press statement 
dated 28 November 1981 affecting non-citizen wives married to citizens of 
( 72) 
Malaysia which took effect as from 30 November 1981. The said 
statement is divided in three parts namely: 
. . (73) 
(i) those married before February 6 , 1980 . 
(ii) 1...hose married on or after 6 February 1980; 
and (iii) right of appeal to the Minister of Internal Affairs in 
c ses of dissatisfaction with the decision of the Director-General of 
Immigration, Malaysia. 
For (i), a social visit pass for one year will be issued on 
application from such wives. This facility will not be given to those who 
are living apart. for a continuous period of five years or more, though 
remain married. For such wives, they have to comply with section 6 
of the said Immigration Act. While in possession of such valid social 
visit pass, such wives are free to come and go from Malaysia without 
having to apply for re-entry permi ls each time they want to enter Malaysia 
under section 6 (1) (a) of the said Immigration Act. Such a pass is ren<.!wable 
every year upon application. Thus for purposes of a residence qualification, 
their temporary absence (
74
) from Malaysia will not be affected for the 
purpose of making application to be registered as citizens by their 
marriages 1...o citizens (article 15 (1) (a) of the Constitution). 
For those married under (ii), a six months ' social visit pass will 
be issued to such wives upon heing satisfied of their marriage to Malaysian 
( 4CJ) 
citizens. After that period, their social visit pass will, upon 
application, be issued on yearly basis and the same condition as in (i) 
above applies as to their absence. 
In both instances, the first social visit pass will be issued 
at the point of entry but they must have the necessary visa. Such facility 
will only be available to those who, at the time of entry or upon re-
application, are still married to Malaysian citizens. It is submitted 
that this indirectly avoids giving the facilities to those who contracted 
the marriages of convenience with the main intention to subsequently 
acquire Malaysian citizenship. 
All the three cases cited above, do not involve illegal 
immigrants which is another area of major problems involving the interaction 
of family and citizenship laws. 
Geographically, Malaysia is very close to Indonesia. There is 
a very strong historical bond between Malays in Johore with those(
7
S) 
of Indonesia. There is exodus of Indonesian immigrants coming into 
Malaysia undetected by the Government through well-organised syndicates. 
Some of them got married to local Malays. Since local Malays are Muslims 
and are not governed by civil law so far as their marriages and divorces 
are conceLned, it would be much easier for those illegal immigrants to 
get married to local Johore Malay women. As pointed out earlier, even 
if those illegal immigrants were brought to book and deported back to 
Indonesia, their children by marriage if born after M~rdeka (Independence) 
. (7G) 
Day (31 August 1957), would be Malaysian citizens by operation of law. 
In such cases, questions of citizenship certainly cause real hardship 
to such families. 
It is therefore my hwnble and respectful suggestion that it is 
probably a right time for the Government to consider setting up a special 
(50) 
tribunal to deal with such problems which can then perhaps look into , 
inter alia : 
(i) the genuiness of their marriages; 
(ii) what caused them to be married ; 
and (iii) look into a cross-section of the hardship caused to such 
families as the result of such deportation. 
By doing so, it is respectfu l ly submitted , certain useful 
informations can be extracted and perhaps where practically possible 
remedy the situation to reduce such hardship. It is further submitted 
that matters like, amongst others; 
(a) marriages of convenience may be effectively detected and 
thus reduced , if not completely eradicated ; 
(b) appropriate steps can therefore be taken to detect the 
well-organised syndicates involved and thus indirectly prevent such 
illegal immigrants from coming to Malaysia in the future ; 
(c) as a follow up to (b), a more effective form of control 
to check the flow of such illegal immigrants can be implemented by the 
Government of Malaysia with the co-operation of the Indonesian Government; 
and (-d) where appropriate, the Government may perhaps exercise its 
discretion to grant citizenship to such husbands upon fulfilling certain 
conditions as to their future character, bonds or any other consideratio11(s) 
the Government deems fit. 
It is also respectfully submitted that since such matters involve 
government' s policy , it is best that such tribunal be chaired by a 
legally qualified person from the Judicial and Legal Services Department 
with at least five years experience in the same Department assisted b y uL 
least two respected members of the ~ublic selected from the cross-section 
of the Malaysian society . 
( Sl) 
[D] As Between Non-Citizen and Non-Citizen 
Non-citizens too while in Malaysia, whether or not they subsequently 
acquire Malaysian citizenship , have their problems depending on the 
circumstances of their case . 
If they rema i n non- Malaysians when they are faced with such 
problems , the i r matr i monial matters will most probably be decided by 
Malaysian Court according to their personal laws if ~hey are ordinarily 
resident in Malaysia . Should they acquire domicile of choice in Malaysia 
but not citizenship of Malaysia , the i r situation will still be the same. 
Depending on whether the i r marriage is monogamous or polygamous , problems 
faced by them will be the same as [B] and [c] above if they subsequently 
obtain Malaysian citizenship , as long as they do not become Muslims. 
If a married couple who became citizens later converted to Islamic faith , 
then Lheir problems will be identical to those faced by Malaysian Muslim 
citizens. The real difficulty will be present when only one of the couple 
does so and not the other . It is the last situation which requires 
detailed discussion so far as this paper is concerned. The case of 
. 1 · . 1 · (7?) U. Viswa ingam v . S. Viswa ingam offers such an example as 
illustrated below . 
The husband (born in Malaysia) was a Hindu by religion . The 
wife (born in Sri Lanka) was a Christian of Anglican faith . Both of them 
were originally citizens of Sri Lanka . They were married on 30 March 1955 
in Colombo (Sri Lanka ) under the provisions of the Marriage Registralion 
0 d . f (78) r inance o Ceylon . After their marriage , they went to Bristol , 
England where the husband conU nued his medical s l:udies . While in 
England , they had two children namely Nambi (born on 9 April 1957) and 
Ajit (born 31 October 1959) . By birth , both Nambi and Ajit are therefore 
British nationals . 
(52) 
When the husband qualified from his medical studies, they 
returned to Ceylon and stayed with the wife's parents free from rent. 
Finding that they cannot settle there, they went to Malaysia in 1961. 
In 1962, another child was born. In 1966, they were staying in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia where the husband opened a private clinic. 
On 31 October 1969, their marriage was registered under the 
Registration of Marriages Ordinance 1952, a step in the process of 
b . . 1 . . . h. ( 79) o taining Ma aysian citizens ip. Later they both became Malaysian 
citizens. 
There were family troubles that estranged their marriage relation-
ship when the husband started to see one Mrs Lobo which ended in December 
1973 when she married an Englishman. As the result of their family 
problems, including the education of their children, the wife and Narnbi 
were sent by him to England. Later on 16 December 1974, he bought a 
house at Edgeware, London, conveying the same in joint names of both 
himself and his wife. 
While his wife was in England, he embraced the Islamic faith 
on 13 August 1976 without informing his wife of the same and later married 
a second w·ife. 
In 1977, the wife filed a petition in England seeking a decree 
of dissolution of their marriage on the ground of her husband's unreasonable 
behaviour to which the husband later filed his reply alleging that the 
marriage had been automatically ended by his conversion to Islam and 
prayed that her petition be dismissed. He bas ed his answer on the strength 
of the "fatwa"(BO) from the "Mufti"(Bl) of the Federal Territory, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia dated March 6, 19 78, which reads : 
"With reference to ... the marriage in question, 
[it is] no longer subsist[ingJ since Ithe 
husband] has embraced Islam and his wife has 
not followed suit." (82) 
(53) 
According to substantively Muslim law, a woman can only marry 
a Muslim man, but a Muslim man can marry a Muslim woman and also a 
k ' ' (
93 ) h. h d • th l' f th "f t II itabiyya woman, w ic accor ing to e ruing o e a wa 
obtained, does not include Christians of Anglican faith. If the "fatwa" 
is right, then a difficult problem will arise as to who are Christians. 
Based on the said "fatwa", the effect of the husband converting 
to Islam on the non-Muslim marriage (unless she too becomes a Muslim) 
will depend on whether or not she is a kitabiyya. If only the husband 
converts and the wife does not follow within three months of such 
conversion, the said marriage ceased to subsist at the end of the said 
three months from the date of the husband's conversion. If the non-
kitabiyya wife however converts to Islam within that period, then the 
marriage will be valid and its validity will revert to the date of the 
h b d I • d h f' , h 1 (94 ) h b d • us an s conversion. Un er s a ii sc oo , the us an is not 
. (85) required to offer the Islamic religion to his wife during this period. 
It is therefore submitted that, if the wife converts to Islam and the 
husband does not do the same within three months of the wife's conversion, 
it must therefore necessarily follow that the marriage will also cease 
to subsist since she can then be married only to a Muslim man. 
On appeal from the decision of Wood J by the husband, Ormrod L.J., 
at page 19, posed three questions. 
(1) Was the marriage brought to an end by the husband's conversion 
to Islam, according to the law of the Federal Territory? 
(2) Is the Court bound to accept that the marriage has come to 
an end or is there what has been called a "residual" discretion to decline 
recognition? 
(3) If there is such a discretion should it be exercised in 
favour of the husband or the wife? 
LAW L:.,~t~f 
-VICTORIA UW\'ERSITY OF WELLINGTOSI 
(54) 
Based on the facts of the case and the law, his Lordship 
concluded that on the husband's conversion the marriage ceased to exist 
and that being the case, the court ought to recognise the change of 
status so effected, subject always to the proviso and according to his 
Lordship could not be a divorce since conversion was neither "judicial 
or other proceedings" within the meaning of "divorce" as found in 
sections 2-5 of the 1971 Act. (
86 ) He therefore held that the present 
case did not fall within the ambit of the said Act and thus dismissed 
the husband's appeal from Wood J's decision of granting a decree nisi 
to the wife of what was alleged of the marriage which was not in 
existence at the time of such petition. From the case, a few observations 
can be made. 
. (87) 
Firstly, in dismissing the appeal Ormrod L.J. pointed out 
that the parties to the proceedings were still both Malaysian citizens 
and subject to the law of that country then in force. Following from 
that observation, the laws governing both Muslim and non-Muslim Malaysian 
citizens were made in accordance with the Constitution. The Constitution 
(88) 
is the supreme law of the country. The rights and duties of 
citizens, regardless of their religion which they are free to profess 
d . (89) . d d b h . . (90) an practice are provi e y t e Constitution. Thus any marriage 
affecting Muslim citizens, will be dictated by various Islamic Enactments 
made in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and in this 
case, will be the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952. The 
"fatwa" involved was made by the "Mufti" of the Federal Territory, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia under t~e said Enactment. It is therefore submitted 
the questions to consider should be thus: 
(1) Was that "fatwa" validly made? 
(2) Will it be accepted by the Court in Malaysia? 
( 5 :J) 
(3) If accepted , what will be the effect of thaL " fatwa " 
so received? 
From the facts of the case, clearly the "fatwa" was validly 
and legally obtained . That being the nature of "fatwu", it will ccrli.1inly 
be accepted by the Malaysian Court. Since the parties were Malaysian 
citizens and the " fatwa " affected them directly , it is submitted that the 
Court will certainly apply Muslim law. Since Shafii school was and is 
observed in Malaysia , it is contended that the full effect of the " fatwa" 
will be given by the Malaysian Court. Thus the effect of the " fatwa" 
on the facts of the case will be that the marriage was no more subsisting 
after three months from the date of the husband ' s conversion to Islam 
s ince the wife did not convert to Islam too during that three months 
period . 
The question of acceptance of such " fatwu" by Malaysian Court 
was recognised even by Wood J , when he said , 
" ... I take the view that a Malaysian Court would 
accept the [ " fatwa " ] given by the "Mufti", and 
so I find ." (91) 
Secondly , following the observation of Wood Jon the effect of 
the "fatwa", then it is submitted with the greatest of respect , his 
Lordship could and should therefore adopt what the Malaysian Court would 
do in the circumstances and gave effect to the sc1id " fatwa " accordin(Jly 
without going further as he did. Since divorce relates to a valid and 
. . . (92 ) h . . I ld h . existing marriage , t e pe~ition s1ou t erefore have failed becuusc 
of the non-existence of such marriage as pointed out above . In other words, 
the Court cannot , with respect, dissolve what was not in existence . 
. kl. (93) R . ll . Hie ing, in commenting the case of U. Viswulinyam, 
supra , concluded his comment in the following words, 
(So) 
"The case illustrates the vigour with which English 
Courts will maintain the rules of natural justice .. . 
according to English standards . " 
It is respectfully submitted that Islamic law cannot be equated with 
the English concept of natural justice . It is contended that if the 
"fatwa" was obtained by a non-Muslim counsel, perhaps the manner in which 
the request for the "fatwa" can be questioned. However , that was not 
the case here . This is evidenced from the statement of Wood J , when 
he said , 
"Doctor Yaacob is a practising lawyer from Kuala Lumpur 
whose standing in the profession in Malaysia is of the 
very highest . He is also a devout Muslim who has 
studied Koran from his early youth , " 
a testimony which speaks for itself. It is my respectful submission 
that in exercising the jurisdiction , the Court should not have applied the 
English concept of natural justice in the circumstances but substantive 
Islamic law . 
(94) 
Dr Lucy Carroll Stout , in critically analysing whether the 
alleged dissolution of the marriage was valid or not according to rj1e 
husband's domicile (that is, Malaysia) in Viswalingam ' s case, supra, 
pointed out that it was totally fallacious assumption that Muslim law 
applied to the case and thus the High Court (presided by Wood J.) founcl 
wrongly on every point of Malaysian law raised. (
95
) She supported her 
observation mainly from the jurisdictional point of view and not on 
h f 1 
. . (96) 
t e question o natura Justice. It is submitted that, that would 
have been a much better approach . By doing so, it would be clear 
that the Court "d[id] not intend in any way to criticise the laws of 
M 1 . th t f tl I 1 . 1 1 · · 11 ( g 7 ) a aysia nor e precep so 1e s amic aw or re igion. 
However , with the greatest of respect to the learned and 
distinguished writer , it is submitted that the question of jurisdiction 
should not be over emphasised in order to determine the effect of the 
(57) 
said "fatwa", but the "fatwa" itself in relation to: 
(1) the definition of whether or not a Christian of 
Anglican faith is a "kitabiyya"; 
and (2) will the Court ..!.n Malaysia whether civil or "kathi" 
Court give effect to such "fatwa". 
It is submitted that nowhere in the judgement of Wood J., 
suggests that he was not adequately guided by relevant materials to 
decide the issue before him . On the contrary, his Lordship was of the 
(98) opinion that such "fatwa" will be accepted by Malaysian Court. 
Ormrod L.J. was of the opinion that , a "fatwa" seems to be something 
in the nature of a declaratory ruling given at the request of a party 
on a point of Muslim religious law which would be acted by the Court in 
. (99) 
Malaysia , and his Lordship therefore accepted Wood J's findings of 
fact as proof of the relevant law of Malaysia . 
(100) . 
However , the Court having accepted the effect of the said 
"fatwa" as ending the marriage automatically on the husband's conversion 
to Islam, asserted that the "fatwa" obtained was against the English 
concept of natural justice since the wife was not given the opportunity 
to challenge the said "fatwa". 
It is with the greatest of respect lo the Court that there are 
certain acts of the husband under Islamic law that the wife cannot 
challenge. A good example is the husband ' s right of "Talaq" (talak"), 
which can be unilaterally exercised (either orally or in writing) by the 
husband without any intervention of either the civil or religious 
authority according to substantive Islamic law . 
Dr Stout questioned as to why the husband did not exercise 
such right . (lOl) Relying on the Selangor Rules Reldting to Marriage, 
Divorce , and Revocation of Divorce 1962 , she concluded that he could not 
(5!3) 
do so since the 1962 Rules expressly provided that, 
"No divorce or pronouncement of divorce will be 
effective unless the wife agrees to the divorce 
and the kathi has approved it." (102) 
With the greatest of respect, I disagree with the learned and 
distinguished writer for the following reasons: 
( ') ' h llf II l'd(l03) i Assuming tat atwa was va i (which it is contended 
it should), how could the husband exercise the right of "talaq" over 
. . . (104) 
a non-existing marriage? 
(ii) There was a three months grace period for the wife to convert 
to Islam (thus saved the marriage) based on the substantive Islamic law. 
During that period there can be no question of the exercise of "talaq" 
because: 
(a) "Talaq" is only applicable to a marriage that is contracted 
according to Muslim law; 
and/or (b) where both parties to the marriage are Muslims; 
(iii) It is submitted that the provision cited above should not 
be construed as to deprive or restrict any Muslim of his substantive 
rights under Muslim law. It is contended that such a provision was 
intended for administrative purposes in order to check and reduce the 
numLcr of Muslim divorces and thus provides a method of effecting 
· 1 · . (105) reconci iation. 
The aJJproach should therefore be to det.ermine as of fact whether 
or not the wife can be considered as a kitabiyya within the context of the 
said fatwa. If she was, then the marriage will remain valid notwithstanding 
the husband's conversion to Islam; if not, the said "fatwa" should be 
respected. 
Based on the facts of the case and the manner in which the 
said "fatwa" was obtained, it is submitted that the High Court of Malaya 
(59) 
will in all probability give full effect to the " fatwa " without going 
into the question of jurisdiction. Thus if the wife were to petition 
for divorce in the High Court of Malaya , it is contended that it will 
most probably be dismissed . 
Thirdly , based on the Court ' s reasoning that the first marriage 
was still in existence , otherwise decree nisi would tillt have been 
granted, will the husband be guilty of bigamy in England when he 
married his second wife , assuming that he again openly declared that 
he was no more a Muslim after the expiry of the required period (three 
months from his conversion to Islam) , but before or at the time of 
his wife ' s said petition? It would appear so since until the decree 
nisi was made absolute , his first marriage still subsisted . However 
that will not be so in Malaysia since he was c1 free man then. If he 
married his second wife while he was a Muslim certainly he can never 
b ·1 f b' (l0 6 ) e gui ty o igamy . 
Fourthly, in recognising that the marriage automatically came 
to an end on such conversion and yet exercised its "residual" 
discretion , was the Court moved by the fact thal hardship would 
be caused to the petitioner by giving effect to the "fatwa"? 
Certainly it can be justifiably concluded so. This is evidenced by 
what was stated by Wood J ., when he said, 
"If I were not to make a decree c1nd were to lec1ve 
the wife to her remedies in Malaysia, she would , 
I understand, recover something for the sum paid 
by her father at the start of the marriage. 
~llowing .. . for inflation, I do not think that ... 
would [be] more thc1n {.5,000 in the Malaysian 
courts."(107) 
(bO) 
Though associating my full sympathy with the wife in the circumstances , 
that should not , it is submitted , be good enough a reason for the 
Court to exercise its "residual " discretion as not to recognise what 
the Court in England accepted the Malaysian Court(s) would do . It 
should not apply conflict rules which in the end may be viewed in 
relation to the English concept of natural justice . To do so, it 
is respectfully contended , would directly or indirectly be an attack 
or to crilicize the laws of Malaysia or the precepts of Islamic 
law or religion. 
The question of the parties ' domicile is the fifth observation 
thal can be drawn from the case. By an accepted rule of domicile, 
the wife retains the domicile of her husband until divorced. 
Once divorced, she can acquire her own domicile of choice if she 
will revive . There was no evidence at all to suggest that the 
husband had at any time the necessary intention to change his 
Malaysian domicile. As such , it must necessarily follow that the 
domicile of the wife must be that of Malaysia until she obtained a 
decree absolute. 
One other important issue which was nol the subject matter 
of the proceedings was the questiu n of the children ' s citizenship. 
From the facts of the case , Nambi and Ajit should not have 
much problem in acquiring citizenship of the United Kingdom by 
virtue of t heir birth. Prai's citize nship matters may encounter 
some diffir ulties . Depending on whose cuslody he was given , p erhaps 
he will subsequently acquire the c itizenship of the p<lrent in whose 
custody he was entrusted. 
(61) 
It will therefore be right to say that problems such as 
those arising from Viswalingam ' s case, supra, clearly demonstrate 
the close relationship between Malaysian family and citizenship 
laws and thus their interaction . 
If a similar situation takes place after 1 March 1982 , 
section 51 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, can 
effectively deal with it without having to resort to the effect of 
a similar "fatwa". Section 51(1) of the Act , expressly provides 
that the wife can now petition for a divorce after the expiration 
(108) 
of the period of three months from the date of the husband's 
I 1 
(109) conversion to s am . By implication , the same will apply 
if only the wife converts to Islam and the husband does not . 'l'he 
operative words in section 51(1) are "one party" and the "other 
party" . It does not specifically say whether the husband or the 
wife . 
'l'hus , it is submitted that though section 51(1) does not 
over-rule the effect of the ''fatwa" similar to that as in the 
Viswalingam's case, it has in effect... made such a "fatwa" obsolete. 
'l'he other important observation that is relevant to the case is that, 
the section above does not specify "what religion". In such 
absence, it is submitted that it matters not whether the other 
party who does not convert to Islam is a Christian of Anglican 
faith or any other religion who cannot be classified as a "kitabiyya". 
(62) 
By section 51(2) of the Act, it specifically gives the 
h k h . . f h . f (llO) Court t e power to ma et e necessary provision or sue a wi e 
or husband (as the case may be) and for the support, care and 
custody of the children of the marriage. 
(6 '3} 
CHAPTER FIVE 
OTHER MA'ITERS 
In this chapter, I propose to discuss matters like: 
(A) Adoption ; 
(B) Legitimacy ; 
and (C) Loss of citizenship however caused. 
(A] Adoption 
This is governed by The Adoption Ordinance (No . 41 of 1952) but it 
does not apply to Muslims . Section 31 of the Ordinance states: 
"This Ordinance shall not apply to any person who 
professes the religion of Islam either so as to 
permit the adoption of any child of such a person 
or as to permit the adoption by any person of a 
child who according to the law of the religion of 
Islam is a Muslim. (1) 
An application for adoption must be made in the mctnner and form prescribed 
by the Adoption Rules 1953. (2 ) It deals in detail with the procedure as 
to how an application is to be made, such as filing of the neces sary 
documents and the service of the s~me as required by section 11 of the 
Ordinance. Adoption can be made either to a High Court judge or a 
president of Sessions Court and the hearing of the application for the 
( 3) 
same will be heard in camera in chambers. Subject to section 31 
above, any person can apply for an adoption order if the necessary 
condition(s) in section 4 of the Ordinance is/are satisfied. 
Upon such an application being made, the Court shall appoint 
a guardian ad litem(
4
) whose duties will be, inter alia, to determine 
that the intended adoption is genuine and to investigate as fully as 
(G4) 
possible all the circumstances of the child concerned and the applicant 
dnd all other matters related thereto in order to safeguard the 
interests of the child(S) before making any adoption order. Before 
making such order under section 3(1) of the Ordinance, a report from 
the guardian ad litem must be received b y the Court and the Court must 
be satisfied with the conditions in section 6 of the same. 
However, there are restrictions imposed by section 4 of the 
Ordinance against making such order which stipulates: 
"(1) An adoption order shall not be made unless 
the applicant or, in the case of a joint application, 
one of the applicants: 
(a) has attained the age of twenty-five and is 
at least twenty-one years older than the child 
... , or 
(b) has attained the age of twenty-one and is a 
relative of the child; or 
(c) is the mother or father of the child. 
(2) ... in any case where the sole applicant is a male 
and the child ... is a female unless the Court is 
satisfied that there are special circumstances 
for making of an order. 
(3) ... in favour of any applicant who is not ordinarily 
resident in the Federation or in respect of any child 
who is not so resident." 
By section 2 of the s..une an "adopted child " means a child 
who has been authorised by the Court(
6
) to be adopted or re-adopted 
d h " h. ld 11 ( 7 ) . . d d an t e c 1 is an unmarrie person un er the age of twenty-one 
and includes a female under that age who has been divorced . 
Looking at section 4 (3) of tb,, Ordinance, it is submitted that., 
even a Malaysian citizen who is not ordinarily resident in the Federation 
cannot make such an application. On the other hand, it would appear that 
there is nothing to stop non-citizens ordinarily re>sident in Malaysia, 
subject to paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 4(1), from doiny so . In the 
latter case , if granted, could lead the adopted child's citizenship 
(Malaysian) Lo be lost. 
(65) 
The other obvious effect of section 4(3), is that foreign 
child not ordinarily resident in Malaysia cannot be the subject of an 
adoption application. However, that does not prevent a child of a 
non-citizen who is, for example, permanently resident in Malaysia 
being adopted by a Malaysian citizen, it would be much eas.ier for the 
said adopted child to apply and obtain Malaysian citizenship. The 
adoptive parent or parents can then apply on his behalf. 
As from March 1, 1982, under the Law Reform (Marriage and 
Divorce) Act 1976, section 2(1), such adopted child is treated as 
"a child of the family". All the provisions under the 1976 Act 
concerning "child or children of the family" will also apply to such 
adopted child with the same force as if he has been born in the lawful 
wedlock. 
For purposes of disposition of property, he will also be 
treated as if he has been born in the lawful wedlock(S) and thus come within 
the prohibited degrees of consanguinity whether or not he is later 
re-adopted by some other person. He will also be treated as the child 
of the family under section 2 of the Inheritance (~amily Provision) Act 
1971. Thus he can benefit from the application for the maintenance made 
on his behalf under section 3(1) of the Act. 
If the adoption is made by a citizen of a non-citizen's child, 
it follows that such adopted child's rights and duties will be, as the 
result of such adoption, similar to those of adoptive parents' children. 
Had he not been adopted, he has no rights, privileges and duties as a 
Malaysian citizen. If he is a minor, he can then be included as a 
child of the family in either of his adoptive parents ' passport or even 
apply his own passport when he i::. big enough to travel on his own or when 
he has good reason (example to go for studies overseas) to do so. For 
(GG) 
purposes of section 11(1) of the Immigration Act 1959/63 (Revised - 1975) 
he is therefore to be treated as a citizen and is not required to have a 
valid entry permit or pass to enter and leave Malaysia; an evidence of 
interaction of family and citizenship laws. 
[B] Legitimacy 
Matters of legitimacy are contained in the Legitimacy Act 
1961 (Revised - 1971) (Act 60). Again Muslims are expressly excluded but 
in negative wording found in section 3(1) of the Act which states: 
"Nothing in this Act shall operate to legitimate a 
person unless the marriage leading to legitimation 
was solemnised and registered in accordance with -
(a) the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 or the 
Christian Marriage Ordinance 1956; 
(b) the Christian Marriage Ordinance or the 
Marriage Ordinance 1959 of Sabah; or 
(c) the Church and Civil Marriage Ordinance 
of Sarawak; 
or ... " 
Since, as shown by the earlier discussion, none of the 
Ordinances aforesaid applies to Muslim citizens of Malaysia, it will be 
clear from the wording of the above section, that the 1961 Act has no 
application to Muslim citizens. Thus an illigitimate child urnler the 
substantive Islamic law will therefore remain to be illegitimate if born 
such if the parents are Muslims. If they are originally non-Muslims but 
later couvert to Islam and if the marriage took place before the conversion 
to Islam then such child will be legitimate and remain Lo be so after 
the said conver~ion. If the marriage is afler the conversion, then the 
child so born to such parents, if illegitimate, will remain to be 
illegitimate. 
(67) 
For the purposes of the 1961 Act, the date of legitimation 
will be the date of the marriage leading to the legitimation or if the 
marriage occurred before the prescribed date then the date will be the 
.b d d (9 ) prescri e ate. In order to have the effect as above, the said 
marriage must be between the said child's mother and father at the time 
(10) 
he was born and not when either of them was married to a third person 
and the marriage must be solemnised and registered in accordance with 
section 3(1) of the Act. The parents of the child must be domiciled in 
Malaysia at the date of that marriage which will render the child to be 
l 
. . (11) 
egitimate. However, if the father of such child at the time of the 
required marriage is not domiciled in Malaysia, but such marria~2 by the 
law of the father's domicile, recognises such child as legitimate, then 
Malaysia will also recognise the child to be legitimate as in section 2 (1) 
of the Act. 
By such legitimation, the legitimated child can take inte rests 
in his deceased parents' estate under section 6(1) of the Act, as if he 
b 1 
. . (12) 
was orn egitimate. He will also have the same rights and obligations 
. (1 3 ) 
in respect of maintenance and support of himself. He will also stand 
h f . h h l . . (l 4 ) . . on t e same ooting as t e ot er egitimate children of the family to 
. (15) 
claims for damages, compensation and the like . Such rights and 
obligations are provided by section 9 of the 1961 Act. 
For purposes of travelling, under the ImrnigraLion Act 1959/63 
(Revised - 1975) he will definitely be considered a child o f the famil y . 
Thus if the parents are Malaysian citizens, he too will be treated as such. 
On the other hand, if they are just permanent residents with domiciles in 
Malaysia, he will be treated as a non-citizen and will require an entry 
permit or pass to enter or stay in Malaysia as demonstrated by the applicant 
. th f I l / . d · ( 16 ) in e case o n Re Meena w o Muniyan i. If such a legitimated 
(68) 
child is still a minor, then upon application by the holder of a permit 
or pass (section 2(1), ibid.) issued for purposes of entering or staying 
in Malaysia (section 10(1), ibid.), to have the name of such legitimated 
child to be included in his or her permit by virtue of section 12 of the 
same Act. 
lme important observation that can be drawn is that children 
born illegitimate to Chinese couples who contracted customary Chinese 
marriages will always remain illegitimate and cannot be legitimated under 
the 1961 Act. The problem can be circumvented easily by having subsequent 
marriages under Civil Marriage Ordinances or church marriages. Thus pure 
conversion of a potentially polygamous customary marriage to monogamous 
by re-marrying as stated above, will therefore legitimate a child born 
to such a couple who would otherwise be illegitimate. 
Before the 1976 Act, in order for an illegitimate child to be 
legitimated, the marriage of his parents had to be valid under section 3(1) 
of the 1961 Act but not otherwise. Hence if a decree of nullity of 
marriage was obtained then the child will also be affected in that he will 
be bastardised by the decree by implication. 'l'his situation is now 
remedied by section 75 of the 1976 Act. 
Section 75(5) of the Act states: 
"Notwithstanding section 6 of the Legitimacy Act 1961 
all children who are deemed legitimate at birth ... shdll 
be so treated in all respects and not as persons 
legitimated at the date of the marriage or of the 
legitimacy Act, 1961 as provided therein." 
By sect;on 2(1) of the 1976 Act, "child of the marrictge" includes an 
illegitimate child and thus enjoys the same protection, rights and 
privil~ges as the children born in lawful wedlock for purposes of 
maintenance and the like. To invoke the 1976 Act, Lhose concerned must 
either be ordinarily residents in Malaysia or citizens of Malaysia either 
(69) 
having residence in Malaysia or abroad or persons ,,.,i th .:alaysiar 
domicile . 
Such a child can be a citizen of Malaysia by operation of law 
under article 14 of the Constitution if conditions laid down in either 
Part I or II of the Second Schedule are satisfied. Thus if the marriage 
for purposes of section 3(1) of the Legitimacy Act 1961, is between a 
non- citizen female , the child so born illegitimate but legitimated by 
such marriage can still be a citizen by registration under article 15 
clause (2) or (3) of the Constitution. The same will apply to a couple 
who were originally not citizens but later either one or both of them 
become citizens of Malaysia a t the time of the birth of such a child . 
Thus the interaction between the family and citizenship laws of 
Malaysia is clearly i llustrated when one looks into matters affecting 
legitimacy . 
[C] Loss of Citizenship 
The paper will not be complete without discussin,J the question 
of loss of citizenship however caused , for the family law is closely 
related either directly or indirectly to matlcrs of citizenship. The 
case of (L) demonstrates the latter. 
In divorce and marriage cases, the welLarc of the "child of the 
family " is cerlainly a malter of prime importance bolh to the Court and 
to the legislature. From earlier discussion, an adopled child and a child 
legitimaled by the marriage of his parents in accordance and in co~Jliance 
with the Legitimacy Act 1961 , will always be treated as the child of the 
family with the rights, privileges and duties as discussed earlier 
(70) 
(under A and B above). Consideration of the "child of the family" 
. 1 · . 1 · (17) taken by Court can be seen in the case of U. Viswa ingam v. S. Viswa ingam 
when Wood J. said, 
"The sum now standing in the joint-names ... is 
l,28,000. I had considered in argument whether 
some part of this should be placed in trust for 
Ajit during his education, ... [and] as I am 
satisfied that [the mother] will do whatever is 
right and proper for the completion of Ajit's 
education."(18) 
What his Lordship was trying to convey was that since the sum 
of (28,000 was not large enough, he did not think it would be necessary to 
put some of those sums on trust for Ajit for his education because he was 
satisfied that his mother would look into the interests and welfare of 
Ajit and to see that he completed his education. 
Parents being responsible for the child's welfare, including 
education, may make a choice as to where their children should receive 
their education and the like. This choice may affect the citizenship of 
their children. In the Viswalingam's case, the husband became worried 
that English was no longer to be the language in which his children were 
taught, the chances of admission to local university in Malaysia and 
claimed the presence of fanatic Islamic elements, decided to send Ajit to 
England to continue his education. Had it not been due to such choice, 
Aj i t could, it is submitted, be a Malaysian citizen by registration under 
article 15(3) of the Constitution. However, due to that choice - coupled 
with the family matrimonial problems, Ajit may later decide to follow his 
mother or decide to acquire citizenship of the United Kingdom taking the 
advantage of the place of his birth. 
Prom the facts of the case, Prai could certainly be a Malaysian 
citizen by operation of ldW under article 14(1) (a) of the Constitution, 
but may renounce his citizenship of Malaysia in preference to and similar 
(71) 
to that of his mother's should she decide to go back to Ceylon or acquire 
the citizenship of the United Kingdom. In the absence of any conclusive 
evidence, whether or not the children will give up their Malaysian 
citizenship (if acquired) will be purely academic, but such problems of 
the family leading to such a choice by their parents may result in the loss 
of Malaysian citizenship. 
Similar choice made by parents of a citizen is more clearly seen 
. h f h. . (19) in t e case o In Re Soon C i Hiang. In this case, the applicant in 
his affidavit in support of his application to set aside an order made 
by the Government in pursuant to section 10 of the Banishment Ordinance 1959, 
stated that he was sent by his parents to Peking in 1953 to further his 
Chinese education. He further stated in the same affidavit he only 
concentrated on his studies and did not participate in any political 
activities that may be or be deemed to be prejudicial to the security 
of Malaysia. He came back to Malaysia in 1958 and stayed with his 
parents. Later he got married and had three children. Since his return 
to Malaysia he had not committed any offence nor was he a member of any 
political party . 
In spite of that, he was still deprived of his citizenship under 
article 24(2) of the Constitution on the ground that he "has voluntarily 
cluimed and exercised in a foreign country, namely China, rights available 
to him under the law of that country, being the rights accorded exclusively 
to its citizens ." 
Four conclusions can be drawn from this case: 
(i) as the result of the choice of his parents, the applicant 
was deprived of his citizenship, which may not have been so, had such a 
choice not been made; 
(72) 
(ii) there was nothing to suggest , otherwise than what he 
has stated in his affidavit in support of his application , that what he 
actually did was other than pure obedience to the wishes of his parents 
who must have thought that what they had decided was in the best interest 
of their son; 
(iii) yet notwithstanding those facts and the fact that he was 
a citizen by operation of law, he was still deprived of his citizenship; 
and (iv) by that deprivation of his citizenship by the banishment 
d 
(20) 
or er issued against him , he was thus made a stateless person unless 
and until accepted by some other country. 
In Re Soon Chi Hiang's case, is also an example that loss of 
citizenship can be political in nature . It was political in that it was 
decided by the Government that he should be banished and the reason for 
it must have been (by inference) that the Government was satisfied that 
the applicant must have participated in political activities that may or 
deemed to be prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. His participation 
must have been construed by the Government that he was exercising 
the rights available to him while he was in Peking under the law of China 
which were.rights accorded exclusively to its citizens. The Government 
is not bound to disclose the ground(s) as to how it arrived at that 
conclusion. 
(21) 
In Mak Sik Kwong v. Min. of Home Affairs, Malaysia (No.2), 
Abdoocader J. said, 
" ... for the purposes of the exercise of his powers 
in making an order of deprivation under Article 24(2), 
it is open to the respondent to take into consideration 
relevant confidential information such as intelligence 
reports and the like without disclosing to the citizen 
where such disclosure would be prejudicial to the 
public or national interest."(22) 
Article 26B(2) of the Constitution does not require the Mi11ister 
concerned to be satisfied that statelessness will not result before he can 
deprive a person of citizenship but is only required to refrain himself 
from doing so if he is satisfied that statelessness will result . This 
( 73) 
can be seen in the words of Wan Suleiman F . J . in the Federal Court case, 
· · f · ( 23 ) · d h' ·d in Min. o Home Affairs v . Chu Choon Yong, when his Lor sip sai , 
"It is incumbent for the Minister to be satisfied that 
the deprivation of citizenship as a prelude to banishment 
does not have the consequences which Article 26(B) (2) 
sought to prevent i . e. as a result of such deprivation, 
such person would not be a citizen of any country or in 
common parlance a stateless person . "(24) 
Political considerations and/or decisions resulting in the loss 
of citizenship without any choice at all by the citizens is well 
illustrated by the Singapore ' s decision to come out from Malaysia on 
9 August 1965. (
25
) That decision came as a surprise to every Malaysian 
citizen . When she became one of the Malaysian states, Her citizens 
automatically became Malaysian citizens without having to renounce their 
. . . h' (26) Singapore citizens ip . By that separation , Her citizens ceased to 
be citizens of Malaysia by virtue of section 12 of the Constitution dnd 
Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act 1965, though quite a number of -Lhem 
decided to remain as Malaysian citizens. The separation created 
immigration problems since many of those affected have their wives, 
children and parents who were reverted back to Singapore citizens. Inter-
marriages between Singapore and Malaysian citizens are also common mainly 
due to similarities in culture, traditions, religions and races of the two 
countries also posed the same problems. 
To overcome those problems, the Singapore Immigration Department_ 
decided to issue three types of passes to such Malaysidn citizens and can 
(27) 
be summarised as follows: 
(i) "Special Visit Passes", valid for two months or more, given 
to those upon application, whose parents or wives and children are 
Singapore citizens; 
(ii) "Long-term Social Visit Passes", will be issued to enable 
those Malaysian citizens whose parents (also Malaysian citizens) who 
(74) 
have a Singapore work permit and are staying in Singapore or to 
Malaysian students studying there; 
and (iii) "To and Fro Passes" ( "pas Ulang Alik"), will be issue.J 
(upon application) to Malaysian male citizens married to Singapore 
citizens staying in Singapore with husbands working in Malaysia or 
unmarried Malaysian citizens with parents staying in Singapore and who 
are Singapore citizens. 
It is submitted that such irrunigration matters will not be 
encountered by such citizens had there not been the political choice 
of the Singapore Government to come out of Malaysia . That choice was 
not the citizens ' choice but that of the Government of Singapore which 
is obviously political in nature . The consequence of that choice, 
Singapore citizens who were also Malaysian citizens before the said 
separation, ceased to be citizens of Malaysia "by operation of law". (
2B) 
Likewise, wives of Malaysian citizens will have to face all the problems 
relating to both family and citizenship matters as foreign wives. 
Those problems were unknown to them when they were Malaysian citizens. 
By virtue of their marriages to Malaysian citizens there will therefore 
be an interaction between both the family and citizenship law of 
Malaysia which affect their rights, privileges and duties similar to 
that faced by all foreign wives. 
(75) 
CHAPTER SIX 
PROBLEMS FACED BY COURT 
Problems arising both from family and citizenship matters a11d 
their interaction can come to Court in one of two ways or a combination 
of both namely, 
(i) when the parties concerned cannot solve their problems 
amongst themselves; 
and (ii) when the aggrieved parties are not satisfied with the 
decision of the "person or persons"(l) making the same. 
In cases where the parties involved are citizens or permanent 
residents of Malaysia, the question of jurisdiction will not be an issue 
to the Court. What it has to determine is the nature of the marriage or 
divorce, as the case may be. If it is monogamous, the law applicable 
will be basically the same as that applied by the English Court with 
modification(s), if any, in accordance with Malaysian law. 
I O . . (
2 ) · 11 T1e case of Mary Ng & Anor. v. oi Gim Teong i ustrates 
problems that can arise from polygamous customary marriage. It was held 
in this case that, under Chinese customary law a husband can divorce his 
wife unilaterally so long as it was made publicly known and not kept a 
secret. Since such a divorce was held to be valid by the Court according 
to Chinese custom, the divorced wife was not entitled to maintenance. In 
coming to that conclusion, the Court had to base its decision on what 
the expert in such customary law had to say, which in this case, was 
Mr Lee Siow Mong whom the Court regarded as an expert. 
Though accepted by the Court as an expert, Kenneth K.S. Wee 
( 3) 
doubted the expertise of Mr Lee Siow Mong though he made no comment as 
(7G) 
to the legal recognition of such a divorce based on Chinese custom . 
He suggested that the approach should be that once such a custom was 
proved to exist in China , then t he burden should shift to its o~ponent 
to prove that it does no t exist in West Malaysia . It is to be noted 
that the expert in the Mary Ng ' s case was called by the respondent . 
What would be the effect if t he wife too called her own expert witness 
who may have g i ven the evidence contrary to what Mr Lee Siow Mong had 
giv en? It is submi tted that in such a situation, the Court may have a 
different view of what constituted a valid divorce according to the 
Chinese custom on the facts of the Mary Ng ' s case and the petitioner may 
just be successful with he r claim for maintenance . It would be different 
if the exper t witness was cal l ed by the Court in which case he would then 
be a neutral witness and t hus avoid possible suspicion of bias . Thus in 
s uch a case , it is submitt ed that the Court should have advised the wife 
to call her own expert witness and if she cannot do so , then the Court 
could call one as a neutral expert witness . 
In the Mary Ng ' s case , it can be observed that there was no 
agreement of any kind between the applicant and the respondent in respect 
of maintenance . So far as the maintenance to the child of the family was 
concerned , it was not disputed by the respondent. What will be the position 
if there was such an agreement between them? This question is perhaps 
answered by the case of Low Ai Bee v. Ralph Eu Peng Lee . (4 ) 
In the Low Ai Bee ' s case , there was an agreement drawn between 
the husband and the wife the day the marriage was dissolved . The said 
marriage was contracted according to the Chinese custom similar to that 
as in the Mary Ng ' s case. 'I'he agreement was exhibited as (Pl) in the 
proceedings whereby the wife sought to enforce the same which the husband 
contended was unenforceable since their marriage was polygamous in nature 
(77) 
and thus the Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such claim since 
the said agreement was in considPration of the dissolution of such 
marriage. The agreement provided inter alia: 
"(i) that the wife shall be entitled to the sole 
custody, control, maintenance and guardianship of the 
said child and the husband shall not in any way 
interfere ... 
(ii) that the husband shall pay to the wife for her 
separate use and the maintenance and support of 
herself and the said child a sum of $600 per month ... "(5) 
After hearing the contentions of the counsels for both parties, 
Abdul Hamid J (as he then was) said, 
"Here, the court is not called upon to adjudicate as 
to the dissolution of the marriage or on any matters 
relating to matrimonial relief but to determine purely 
on the question of the payment of the maintenance which 
the dependent voluntarily agreed to pay to the plaintiff 
and the child of the marriage. This court, in my view, 
has jurisdiction to enforce the agreement . 
.... Clearly, under the Married Women and Children 
(Maintenance) Ordinance 1950, the plaintiff could, 
if the defendent had not agreed to pay maintenance, 
apply ... and the court would have jurisdiction to make 
an order requiring the defendant to make monthly 
allowance for the maintenance of the child."(6) 
In both the said cases, the Court awarded the "child of the 
family" maintenance under the 1950 Ordinance with a slight difference. 
In the Mary Ng's case, the liability (except the quantum) of the husband 
to pay maintenance to his child was not in dispute. In Low Ai Bee's case, 
supra, what was contested was the enforcement of Lhe agrPement entered 
into by ~he parties on January 11, 1971, the date of the di s solution of 
the marriage. That, it is submitted, amounted to an indirect dispute 
by the husband to pay maintenance to his son by alleging that the 
agreement was not enforceable against him. Item (ii) above, clearly 
shows that part of the sum agreed upon and stipulated must have also been 
meant for and towards the maintenance of their child. Though his Lordship 
did not make any reference to the wife's right to claim maintenance under 
(78) 
the Ordinance in respect of the dissolution of a customary polygamous 
marriage identical to that of Mary Ng's case, supra, it was nevertheless 
made very clear about the child's right. 
In the Low Ai Bee's case, the challenge of the Court's 
jurisdiction was not based on the parties ' citizenship or .residence 
but on the question of the enforcement of a separation agreement of a 
customary polygamous marriage. Whether or not the Court will entertain 
any matrimonial proceedings of non-citizens or residents can be seen 
in the case of Mohan v. Mohan,(?) where the parties to the proceedings 
were domiciled in Ireland. In this case , the wife appealed against 
h d ' . f h . h . (B) . d. . . h . . t e ecision o t e Hig Court in Penang in ismissing er petition 
for divorce under section 49(1) (b) of the Divorce Ordinance 1952 based on 
three years' residential qualification. In allowing the appeal by the 
wife and touching on the "three years' ordinarily resident" qualification, 
Ong C.J . (Malaya) said, 
"With respect I think the learned judge appears to 
have overlooked the fact that irrunediately after 
their marriage in Ireland on July 4, 1955, the parties 
left for Malaya and have for the past 15 years had 
their matrimonial home in the Federation. In the 
circumstances there can be n r doubt that the petitioner 
has been 'ordinarily resident' in the Federation since 
1955 • II (9) 
His Lordship posed a question as to the obj e ct anJ purpose of the 
said section and was of the opinion that it was to spare a wife of 
needless hardship. Such observation, in the circ umstances, should be 
endorsed as correct since as pointed out by hi s Lordship, to refuse the 
wife of the remedy because of the parties' domicile was Ireland amounted 
. (10) 
to "compelling her to petition for divorce in Ireland" and sL ... ted, 
"The prescribed period of three years coulJ only have 
been intended to prevent transient visitors, who are not 
bona fide resident[s], with some degree of permanence 
in the Federation from availing themselves of the 
court's assistance."(11) 
(79) 
Thus temporary abse nce as found by the learned lrial judge at the 
trial of the petition, should not , it is submltted , deprive her of lhe 
remedy . It can be argued that given the presence of the matrimonial 
home in the Federation , they must have i ntended to treat Malaysia as 
their permanent r es i dence(l
2
) though domiciled in Ireland . 
Qu est i ons of Musl i m marr i ages and divorces are matters for 
"kathi " (Muslim " j udge ") where parties involved are Muslims . However , 
should a situation like that in the case of u. Viswalingam v . 
S . Viswalingam(l
3
) be faced by a Malaysian Court , it is contended that , 
it will not have much probl e m since the Court will recognise and give 
effect to the ruling of the " fatwa". Hence as submitted ear l ier , the 
wife wi ll fai l in her pet i tion if she were to bring her action for 
divorce in a Malaysian Court . 
Under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 , the 
Court is well guided as to matters of mar riage and divorce , save Lhose 
as affecting t h e Muslims , natives of Sabah and Sarawak and the aborigines 
of West Malaysia (section 3(4) , ibid) . All marriages after l March 1982 , 
will be monogamous . Those which were polygamous will be deemed as 
monogamous by virtue of section 4(2) of the said Act . 
The jurisdiction of the Court to grant divorce is now given 
by section 48(1) which stipulates : 
"(1) Nothing in this Act shall authorise the Court to 
make any decree of divorce except -
(a) Where the marriage has been registered 
sections 3(1) and 27 or deemed to be registered 
section 4(2) under this Act; or 
(b) Where the marriage between the parties was 
contracted under a law providing that , or in 
contemplation of which , marriage is monogamous ; and 
(c) Where the domicile of the parties lo the marriaye 
at the time when the petition is presenled is in 
Malaysia ." 
(80) 
Thus in order for the Court to find jurisdiction, it must be satisfied 
that (i) the marriage in question is monogamous in effect and (ii) both 
parties are domiciled in Malaysia. However a wife can still petition 
treCourl for a divorce against her husband notwithstanding section 49(1) (c) 
if she falls either within paragraph (a) or (b) of section.49(1). In 
such a case, the Court will then determine the issues in accordance with 
section 49(2) of the same. 
In nullity proceedings, the Court has power to grant a decree 
of nullity of marriage where both parties to the marriage reside in 
Malaysia at the time of the commencement of the proceedings under 
section 67(c) of the Act so long as the said marriage has been registered 
or deemed so under the Act(l
4
) or where the marriage contracted under a 
. (15) 
law providing or in contemplation of a monogamous marriage. 
In exercising matrimonial jurisdiction, the Court may order a 
man to pay maintenance to his wlfe or his former wife(l 5 ) and in 
special circwnstances order the wife to pay maintenance to her husband 
(17) 
or former husband. A woman can be ordered to pay or contribute 
towards the maintenance of her child if it is satisfied reasonable to 
do so having regards to her means. (lB) At any time the Court may order 
a man to do the same for the benefit of his child. (l 9 ) Injunction can 
also be issued against molestalion under section 103 dl any stage of any 
matrin,onial proceedings. 
Unlike with marriage and divorce cases, problems of citizenship 
affecting the family to the marriage come before the Court normally as the 
result of dissatisfaction with tl1e decision of those executive powers. 
Dissatisfaction in the form of Lhe right of a wife of a cilizen 
to remain in Malaysia was advanced in the case of In Re Meenal w/o 
. . (20) 
Muniyandi. As such the applicant was not satisfied that she should 
be detained with a view to deportation and thus contended that such 
(81) 
detention was unlawful. Her contentions were not accepted by the Court 
which held that she was not entitled as of right to an entry permit to 
enter or remain in Malaysia by reason solely of the fact that she was 
married to a citizen . However , as a general rule, it can reasonably be 
concluded from that case that she was given special facilities by reason 
of her marriage to a citizen which will not easily be given to "pure" 
non-citizens unless they are "special categories of persons such as 
professional or persons with specialist qualifications and persons with 
a special certificate from the Minister certifying that their admission 
(21) 
is in the economic interest of the country . " There was no evidence 
to show that she appealed against the decision requesting her to leave 
Malaysia . That , it is submitted , may have been the reason why the Court 
endorsed the decision of such executive act. Had she appealed against 
such a decision , it would at least enable the Court to investigate as to 
the reason for refusal and may have come to a different conclusion. 
. (22) 
In Kuluwante (an Infant) v. Govt. of Malaysia & Anor . , the 
plaintiff born a non-citizen was taken by her mother to India to attend 
school travelling on an Indian Passport . Later she was left alone there 
while the mother came back to Sarawak and in 1972 she became a Malaysian 
citizen and surrendered her Indian Passport. The rest of the family later 
too became Malaysian citizens . In 1973, the plaintiff's father applied 
to the Registrar of citizenship to register the plaintiff as a citizen 
under article 15(2) of the Constitution. The application was rejected. 
In 1976, both the plaintiff and her father made representations to tlie 
Registrar for reconsideration and was again rejected . The reason for the 
rejection was that she was not a permanent residenl of Sarawak when th,· 
application was made . It is to be noted that the plaintiff did not 
appeal to the Minister under section 4 Part III of the Second Schedule of 
(8~) 
lhe Constitution against the decision of the Registrar and therefore 
the Court should not have entertctined the plaintiff ' s claim for the 
declaration that the decision of the Registrar as invalid . 
The Court held that in exercise of its inherent supervisory 
jurisdiction it has the general power to make declaratory judgement in 
order to ensure that statutory tribunals , whether judicial or administrative , 
made their determination in accordance with the law and therefore could 
entertain an action for declaration to correct an error of law in pro-
ceedings inval i d or a nullity . However it was held that since the 
plaintiff had not exhausted the alternative remedy of an appeal to the 
Minister , the claim for the declaration should be dismissed . Again 
fail u re to appeal resulted in the remedy sought being refused. The 
effect of that refusal by the Registrar will be that the plaintiff will 
have to apply for citizenship on her own behalf later and not by 
registration . 
The plaintiff went to India and stayed there not 011 her own choice 
but that of her parents ' but was still being deprived of her right to be 
registered as a citizen. Sin1ilar choice made by the parents for the sake 
of education of their child which resulted in com1,lete deprivation of 
· · · S h' . ( 23 ) h' I I b citizenship is exhibited by In Re oon C i lliang , w ic1 1as een 
discussed earlier and needs no repetition here . ln Lhal case , the Courl 
did not set aside the order of banishment because the applicant faiJed to 
discharge the onus to the satisfaction of the Court that he was not 
actually involved in political activities while he was in China otheL Lhan 
his affidavit in support of his application to set aside the order. The 
Court however , held the view that the words, 
"A decision of the Federal Government under Part III 
of this Constitution shall not be subject to appeal or 
review in any Court, " 
( 3) 
does not , in the absence of ex.~icit ·,.;ors ':.o 
the CoUl. t ' s general and inherent s .:: en·isory power to cor-rect a er::.-or 
of law in the proceedings before a trib :.al b 
. (24) (25) 
JudgernenL or for an order of certiorari. 
submitted, could and will allow appeal or review the trib ~a~'s 
findings of law (though not the facts) i:-i a_pro_ ria::e cases i .. or-.·e:r-
to correct an error of law since , 
'' ... Minister [or tribunal] must be co~pe~led to observe 
the law , a nd it is essential that bure cracy ~·s:: be 
kept in its place [that is , con:c..nin o., y t:o :::. .. d::.. s 
of facts and leaves that of law to the Co-.:n: . " ( 2~) 
The above v i ew was not shared by Ong Hoe~ Sim , ' • I ...... i. 
. . (27) . h .d v . Min . of Horne Affa i rs , wnen e sai , 
"Whatever compl aints he may wish to preser t ·,,·i th regar s 
either to the manner or the circumstances· n er whic: 
the order o f deprivation [of citizenship) ... or as t:o 
its propriety , cannot be entertained ... Even if he 
wishes to make an attempt to challenge the or er of 
deprivation , he would find himself barred from doin 
so by ... Part III of the Constitution .. . . " (28) 
and thus dismissed the apr,lication to set aside t! e ba: is' men or ·er 
made against the applicant . He however , pointed out ir . i:· 
( ') 
\'. p. p. 
by way of-obiter, that he hoped the authorit: ea ing with s ·eh atLer 
will take it as their primary duty to satisfy thernsel ·es of, ar, 1 o rn ·t.! 
full inquiry into, the status of a person befure m.kinq su~h order 11ier 
i 
the Banishment Ordinance . Since t.here was no olJjection lJy tle f'.P . • ,._pinst 
the setting aside of such order , his Lordship exercis~! Le Co· rt's 
inherent jurisdiction to do so. It is with the qre test of res1ect 
submitted that his Lordship setLing aside tl e banishment or,er in 
Kung Aik ' s case, supra , is understandable since then~ wds no o ection from 
the P . P . Based on his reasoning in the Liew Shin Idi ' s c.se, it is 
submitted also that should there be an objection by the P. his L rdslnp 
would c1lmost certainly have dismissed the appli <:1tion, or to u otherwise 
(84) 
would amount to contradicting himself in the matter of interpretation of 
Part III of the Constitution . It is therefore contended that the view 
expressed in In Re Soon Chi Hiang and the Kuluwante ' s case , must be 
an accurate statement of law affecting citizenship matters . 
Be that as it may , unless and until the decision of the Federal 
C t 
(30 ) 
our is available on this matter , it is contended that matters 
involving citizenship will remain uncertain . However , it is submitted 
that from discussion above , there is a definite interaction between 
ci t izenship and family laws of Malaysia . 
(85) 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
It has been demonstrated that man "in pursuit of value" in 
search for his needs and wants for betterment for himself and his family 
exercises his choice and preferences . Marriage and citizenship choice 
are definitely the result of such exercise and are inter- related . After 
exercising such choice and preference he may later find out that there 
are better alternatives or what he has already chosen may not be suitable 
and this may be the cause of him changing his citizenship or divorce . 
Citizenship and family laws of Malaysia are based and evolved 
from historical development of Her population structure that affects the 
rights, duties and obligations of the present citizens which are found 
in Iler Constitution directly or indirectly. History too differentiates 
the Muslim citizens from those non-Muslims with different rights and 
duties . Amongst those rights is the right to marry according to one ' s 
custom or religion . The same applies to divorce . 
The family law in Malaysia can be classified into : 
(i) Pre - and Post-1976 Act period; and 
(ii) Muslim and Non-Muslim laws of marriage and divorce. 
So far as Muslim citizens are concerned the Muslim law of 
Marriage and Divorce is not affected by the 1976 Act. lts law is based 
on Islamic principles found in the Holy Koran and a matter for "kathi". 
In case of dO\ bt , resolve to "fatwa" will be the result . The "fu.twa" 
will bind the parties concerned and if gazetted will bind all Muslims 
faced with the same problem(s). 
(86) 
For non-Muslim citizens, the law of Marriage and Divorce after 
1 March 1982 will be governed by the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 
1976. The Act now prohibits polygamous marriage amongst non-Muslim 
citizens and recognises only monogamous marriages. The ground for divorce 
is made uniform throughout Malaysia and is now based on irretrievable 
break down of marriage. It is, in other words, a comprehensive and 
codified law of Marriage and Divorce affecting all non-Muslim citizens 
throughout Malaysia and also regulates those such citizens who contracted 
their marriages abroad. Registration of all marriages is now made 
compulsory by the Act. The Act also declares that all subsisting 
polygamous marriages on the date of coming into force of the same will be 
deemed monogamous and thus prevents the parties to such marriages to 
contract another valid marriage during the subsistence of the existing 
polygamous marriage. It also deals and regulates in detail the law as 
to divorce. 
For pre-1976 Act, marriages and divorces, the law applicable to 
them, depended on the type of the marriage contracted. In a customary 
marriage, which is polygamous in nature, the appropriate custom and rites 
must be observed. If that was observed, then the law will recognise as 
valid such marriage and divorce. In the latter case, the wife to such 
a marriage cannot claim maintenance from her husband as demonstrated by 
(1) 
the Mary Ng's case, but the child of the family can do so under the 
(2) . Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Ordinance 1950, thus certain 
degree of injustice may be caused. Those who by t:heir custom were 
permitted to contract customary marriage can however, opt to have their 
marriage conducted or to be re-married under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 
1952, in which case they will not then be able to contract another marriage 
during the subsistence of the first marriage. For Christian Chinese, 
(87) 
for example, they can also contract Christian marriages under the 
Christian Marriage Ordinance 1956 or other similar Ordinances then in 
force in Malaysia; but this could not prevent them from contracting 
another polygamous marriage . 
Under the Registration of Marriage Ordinance 1952 1 there was no 
. . d h h · · d (J) provision un er t e same to ave such polygamous marriages registere . 
Thus the Ordinance is more for a statistical purpose . However , evidence 
of registration of foreign marriages under this Ordinance is the 
preliminary step to have a wife of a citizen registered under article 15(1) 
of the Constitution for purposes of acquiring Malaysian citizenship. 
For monogamous marriages and divorces , they were governed by 
the same principles as applied by English Court with modification(s) 
according to any written law of Malaysia then in force . 
Questions like adoption or legitimacy and the like also differ 
between Muslim and non - Muslim citizens. All relevant Ordinances and Acts 
pertaining to such matters will not apply to Muslim citizens. However, 
legitimation by marriage was not available to Chinese who contracted 
customary polygamous marriage, if the said marriage was intended to 
legitimate an illegitimate child. That could be circumvented by 
converting the potentially polygamous marriage to monogamous by re-marrying 
under the appropriate Ordinance. Either adopted child or legitimated 
child will be treated as the "child of the family" for purposes of 
inheritance and the like. 
Since the question of citizenship affects family law or vice versa, 
problems that are real in fact and cannot be solved by the parties 
concerned, will definitely come before the Court. 
Renunciation of citizenship can be due to fctctors like culture, 
adaptability or family betterment and opportunity as the result of 
marriage of a citizen to a non-citizen. If the non-citizen wife married 
(88) 
to a citizen were to remain in Malaysia, she must possess a valid pass, 
since she cannot claim as of right to remain in Malaysia purely because 
she is married to a citizen, though special facilities may be accorded 
to such a wife. (
4 ) 
Where the citizen is dissatisfied with the tribunal's decision, 
(5) 
the Court can always remedy the defect in law though not the facts, 
but all avenues of appeal must be attempted, otherwise the Court will not 
1 · f ( 
6 ) h h · · · · h d b al 1 · d ( 
7 ) grant re ie, t oug it is not an opinions are y JU ges 
of Malaysia. In such cases, a citizen can loose his citizenship making 
him a stateless person unless and until another country is prepared to 
accept him as Her citizen which is rather difficult to expect. 
Thus, while the 1976 Act, makes the non-Muslim laws of marriage 
and divorce and matters incidental thereto more certain, the question of 
citizenship is still uncertain. Perhaps since citizenship is such an 
important matter to everyone, it may be an appropriate time for the 
Government to make citizenship laws simple enough for Her citizens to 
understand and also give necessary publicity especially , how a citizen 
can be deprived of his citizenship. By doing so, it is respectfully 
submitted,- the Government may be able to develop a better and real sense 
of loyalty to the country. Further, such a noble act , could unite the 
families of Malaysian citizens better and thus reduce the problems faced 
by both family and citizenship laws. It will also help the Court reduce 
its workload and hence will be able to devote its time to other urgent 
and pressing needs. 
By way of suggestion, such publicity can be included as one of 
the leaves when issuing Malaysian Passports to Her citizens informing the 
holders how they can be deprived of their citizcnshi~ ~nd ~1e consequences 
of such loss. Alternatively, such matters should be considered as part 
(89) 
of the school curriculum and also the consequences of such loss on 
family law. Sense of legal consciousness should also be encouraged right 
from a tender age. 
Perhaps it may again be stressed here that an establishment of 
a special tribunal to deal with matters of illegal immigrants (especially 
those from Indonesia) that affect both citizenship and family laws of 
Malaysia be considered by the Government. 
It is t~erefore contended that, there is no doubt that family 
law is certainly inter-related closely with matters of citizenship and 
sometimes superimposed on each other that one tends to think that they 
have no connection with each other at all. In conclusion therefore it 
is submitted that, there is a definite interaction between the family 
and citizenship laws of Malaysia. 
ereka · i eh 
minta pas 
jangka pan ·ang 
ke Singapura 
I 
WAROANBOARA Malayala yana mcmpunyal 
lbu bapa, anak atau later! yana menjadl waraaneaara 
Slnaapura klnl dlbolchkan mcmohon a&lah 11tu dart 
tjga pu Janak• panjana yana baru dikeluarltan oleh 
Jabatan Imlgresen Sln.111pur1, 
Pegawal Penerangan lmlgresen Singapura, Enclk 
Goh Ck yang dlhubungl oleh ~tttfan Malaysia mem-
berltahu, tiga pas jangka panjang yang baru dlke-
luarkan Jtu lalah, pas jangka yanjang, pas lawatan 
sosial jangka panjang (L-T SVP) dan pas perjalanan 
ulan~ alik. 
~ . 
"Bagi pas jangka panjang, para pcmegangnya 
akan dapat tinggal di Slngapura leblh dari dua bulan, 
bergantung kepada keperluan termasuk wargane-
gara Malaysia yang mempunyal lbu bapa, anak-anak 
a tau istcri yang mcnjadi rakyat Singapura," kata En- / 
cik Goh. 
Mcnurutnya, bag! rakyat Malaysia yang mcmc-
gang borang masuk dan keluar yang berwarna hijau, 
kini boleh memohon pas lawatan sosial jangka pan-
jang. 
Pas lawatan ~osiaJ janeg panjang juga boleh di-• 
poho"n oleh para pc!aiar Malaysia yan.l( telah tamat 
pengajian tctapi masih tinggal di Singapura sehingga 
mereka membuat keputusan sama ada melanjutkan 
pelajaran atau mencari pekcrjaan. 
· Permit k~ 
"Bagi warganejlat.a~ysia 1-ang berumur di ba-
wah 21 tahun dafl\nkmpunyai 1bu atau bapa yang 
memegang permit kerja Singapura, juga boleh me-
mohon pas yang sama," tambahnya. 
·se~entara wa.rganegara
0
Malaysia yang berkahwin 
dengan wanita -rakyat Singapura sebelum 1 Jun yang 
tinggal di Singapura, tetapi bekerja di Malaysia, 
boleh juga memohon pas perjalanan ulang alik. 
Manakala rakyat Malaysia (warganegara) yang ~ 
masih bujang dan mempunyai ibu bapa wargane&11ra (- { . 
Singapura, tiRggal di Singapura bersama ibu bapa•. CO ' Y~ 
mereka, tetapi bekerja di Malaysia, boleh juga me-
mohon pas perjalanan ula!!E_ alik. 
Katanya, pas yang sama Juga dikeluarkan kepada 
para pemandu teksi Malaysia yang membayar cukai 
jalanraya Singapura dan mempunyai permit masuk 
ke Singapura bagi teksi mereka. 
Para pemandu dan kelindan lori rakyat Malay~ia 
yang sering berulang alik kc Singapura juga boleh 
memohon_pas · jenis ini. 
Perubahan baru 
Manakala pemandu bas berdaftar di Malaysia 
yang membawa kanak-kanak ~ekolah dan pemegang 
I permit kerja harian ke Singapura, boleh juga memo-
hon pas~ tersebut. 
Menu rut beliau, bagi pas·. perjalanan ulang alik 
boleh didapati di pusat pemeriksaan Woodlands Se-
berang Tarnbak Johor di sini yang rnula dibuka 
seka.rang hin.l{Ra 30 Mei depap. 
ManakaJa pas lawatan sosiaJ jangka panjang dan 
pas jangka panjang boleh didapati di Jabatanlrnigre-
sen, Empress Place. 
Sementara bagi warganegara Malaysu, yang 
mempunyai ibu bapa yang memegang permit kerja di 
Singapura, boleh rnemohon di pejabat permit kerja, 
Anson Road. Singapura. 
(~U) 
Appendix (A) 
1.:....---- -- ---
Scmcntara Pengarah lm1gre~en W1iu>ah S lut;in 
Encik Do~my Ibrahim keti\..a dihubung1 berkata 
pcrubahan baru yang dibuat olch Jabatan Imigresen 
Singapura itu adalah hak merek11 dan !>epatutnyalah 
pihak Singapura yang mengcluarli.an sebarang pera-
turan mengenai kemasukan rakyat Malaysia ke 
Singapura, manakala pihak lmigresen Malaysia ti-. 
daklah semestinya diberitahu terlebih dahulu. 
Waiau bagaimanapun, menurutnya, pihak 
lmigresen Malaysia sehingga ini belum membuat se-
barang perubahan baru mengenai pas-pas masuk 
bagi rakyat Singapura ke Ma1aysia. 
----------------- --------
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. s·elepas 5 ahun . 
:KUALA LUMPUR 28}..,ov. -.Pas lawat.an-(sosial) dari sctahun kc set.-1hn akan 
~iberiluin kepada isteri-isteri asing wargancgara Malaysia yang bcrkah11, in sebelum 
{i :Februari 1980 untuk selarna lima tahun. 
:Selepas tempoh terse-
but permohonan permit 
I-
i-
:a 
~ 
I 
t· 
. a 
:Ii 
l: 
g 
h 
n 
h 
1] 
Ii 
masuk mereka alurn d1i>-
ertimbangkan, menurut 
kcputusan keraJaan 
mcngenai penyemakan 
semula dasar kemasukan 
isten asing yang akan 
berkuatkuasa lusa. 
Kcputusan yang diu-
mumkan oleh Jabatan 
J.mi~csen juga mcnyc-
but n ~ahawa istcri-
isteri asing yang bcrkah-
win selcpas 6 Fcbruari 
· 1980 akan dibcri pas Ja-
watan (sosial) dan dilan-
jutkan sclama cnam bu-
lan. 
Selcpas tamat tcmpoh 
tcrscbut pas Jawatan me-
rcka bolch dilanjutkan 
dari sctahun kc sctahun 
dan mcrcka juga layak: 
mcmohon permit masuk 
sclcpas lima tahun bc-
rada di ncgara ini. 
lsteri-isteri asing yang 
tidak bcrpuas bati 
dcngan keputusan Ketua 
Pcngarah lmigrcscn bo-
Jch mcravu kcpada Mcn-
teri Hai' Ehwal Dalam 
Ncgcri. 
·Kcnyataan itu me-
nambah isteri-istcri e.sing 
yang berkahwin sebc!um 
atau · pada 6 Februari 
1980 dan bclum diberi 
pas lawatan (sosial) dari 
setahun kc sctahun, harus 
mcmbuat perm'ohonan di 
pejabat-pejabat im1gres-
cn . 
Pcrmohonan bolch di-
bua t dengan borang ra-
sm1 dan bayaran $10 
dengan discrtakan sah-
nan fotostat sijil perkah-
winan. 
lstcri-istcri asing yang 
tclah mcndapat kcmuda-
han ini hanya diperlukan 
mcmbuat nermohonan 
bila pas Jawatan {sosial) 
mcreka hampir tamat. 
Kcnyataan itu mcnc-
! gaskan, mcrcka yang tel-
1' ah berkahwin scbclum 
atau pada 6 Februari 
1980 tctapi tclah tinggal 
berasingan sclama Juna 
tahun bcrterusan analah 
tidak Jayak mendapat 
kcmudahan terscbuL 
lsteri-isteri asing yang 
bcrkahwin selepas 6 Fe-
bruari 1980 diminta 
mcmbuat permohonan di 
pejabat-pejabat imigres-
pas la11,atan (so,1al) untuk 
'tempoh enam bulan 
Permohonan im haru, 
dilalukan dengan borang 
ra,m1 dan b.1yar,rn SIO 
be,crta sa h nan foto,tat 
~tJtl perkahwinan dan 
a tau bul11-buk11 lain :,,ting 
mengesahkan perbh"" 1-
nan mercka. "" 
Da lam tcmpoh ... enam 
bulan itu Jabat~ Jm1-
gresen akan ,mcneliti 
dokumen-do umen yang 
d1kemukakan b!igi mem-
pa tikan kctulenan perk-
ahwinan mcreka. 
Selcpas tempoh cnam 
bulan itu pas l .. watan 
(sosial) akan diperbaha-
rui dari setahun kc seta-
hun jika permohonan d1-
buat, dengan menanda-
tangani suatu bon. 
Menurut ken,ataan itu 
syarat mcnandatangani 
bon ini sebenarnya tclah 
d1amalkan sebelum ini . la 
bertuJuan mempastikan 
kedudukan istcri-istcri 
asing akan terjamin dan 
tidak teraniaya sekiranya 
berlaku perpisahan. pcr-
ceraian, atau didapati 
. perkahwinan itu adalah 
suatu pcrkahwinan untuk 
mendapat kemudahan. 
lsteri-isteri asing yang 
telah dibenarkan tinggal 
di negara i111 atas pas la-
watan (sos1al) dari seta-
hun kc ~etahun adalah 
bebas untuk keluar ma-
suk negara ini, dan d ibe-
narkan menyambungnya 
jika pas itu tamat tem-
pohnya scmasa merela 
bcrada d1 luar ncgeri 
Ken) a taan 1tu 
meng111gatkan bahawa 
is1en-1stcn asing ) ang 
pcrtama kali memasuk1 
negara 1111 dan berasal 
dari ncgara yang pcrlu 
\'tsa. harus mcndapatk..111 
visa !>cbelum mcmasuki 
negara ini . Selepas ini 
mereka bolch membuat 
pcrmuhonan mendapat-
kan pas lawatan (sos1:.ll) 
Kcn)ataan rncn,1mbah 
baha"a ki:mud:ihan pJ!> 
akan ditarik balik sel1ra-
nya isteri-istcri asing 
didapati tclah bcrpisah 
alau berccrai Jengan 
suaminya ata ... J.Hlll jika 
perkahwinar. mcrcka 
• l. ------
r 
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\ 
steri2 as·~g 
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as6 Fe ruar1 
ar me awa 
negara asal 
KUALA LL'~1Pl'R. 1 6 D s - \\' r..: _wt.'-~ 
berkahv.1n dengan rak;rat \l~ia e'e;:,:i. - · 
tahun lalu ada\ah dtbcnu :i 
mereka Jtl..:l mere ~ r:,:Jh . 
Pengarah lmip.re~. Enc1 
IOI. --
Katanya, mereka boleh 
mclawat tanahair mcrcka 
send1ri kerana mereka 
akan diberi layanan yang 
sama scperti pclawat-
pclawat lain yang datang 
Ice ncga ra ini 
Encilc Ibrahim mcm-
bcri penjclasan ini ben-
kutan satu kcmusylci!an 
yang ditimbullcan o!ch 
scorang pembaca dalam 
scbuah alchbar tcmpatan 
bcrhubung dcngan dasar 
baru Imigrcsen - )ang 
menghcndaki istcri-istcn 
asing mcnd1am1 ncgara 
mi selama lima tahun 
bertcrusan sebclum d1-
bcri taraf pemastautin 
tetap. 
Pcmbaca itu mcndalc-
wa adalah tidak adil un-
. tuk memalcsa para istcri 
asing t1nggal di Malaysia 
sclarna lirna tahun scbe-
lurn rnercka dibenarkan 
Ice luar ncgcri. 
Enc1k Ibrahim mcne-
gaskan dasar baru itu 
Jelas mcnyatakan bahav.a 
mcrcka yang berkahwm 
sclcpas 6 Fcbruari, tahun 
lalu akan dibcri pas .a-
watan sosial sebaga1 pc-
lawat b1asa bila mcrna-
suki negara ini 
Pa·s tcrsebut apabila 
tamat ..tempohnya akan 
dilanJutkan enam bulan 
lag1 dan selepas nu hen-
daklah d1perbaharui 
t1ap-11ap tahun mengikut 
pcraturan yang dnctap-
kan olch J...etua Pengarah 
lm1g.re~en. 
Encik Ibrahim berkata 
mereka dari katcgori itu 
bagaimanapun hanya 
layak memohon permit 
masuk setelah berada d1 
negara ini ~elama lime 
tahun 
J:kliau 111cncgasL111 ~e-
kal1 lag1 kclayakan untuk 
memohon ll(fa' 
rnakna b3he 3 ,x 
itu mempun;rai h3. me -
dap3t taraf .,.arg;i.r.epr- . 
Adalah men_ ac!1 ., · 
mut1a · kera_aa n 1:r.n:, 
mcnolak atau me a~:i:1i 
sebarang permo ... n" .. 
Jelasn;ra , - Bernam .. . 
\ ':;jj) 
KENYATAAN AKHBAR JABATAN IMIGEp~s~·~ 
BERKAITAN DENGAN PENYEMAK1"rsEMULA DASAR 
KEMASUKAN ISTERI-ISTERI ASING KEPADA 
WARGANEGARA MALAYSIA 
----------------------------------------
1. Kerajaan telah membuat keputusan mensenai kemasukan 
isteri-isteri asine seperti berikut:-
' . 
(i) Isteri-isteri asing yane berkahwin 
sebelwn 6hb. Februari, 1980, samada 
mereka membuat permohonan sebelum atau 
selepas 6hb, Mac, 1980, mereka akan 
diberi Pas Lawata~ (Sosial) dari 
setahun ke setahun selarna 5 tahun. 
Hanya selepas tempoh itu permohonan 
Permit Masuk mereka akan dipertimbangkan. 
(ii) Isteri-isteri asing yang berkahwin 
selepas 6hb, Februari, 1980, mereka 
akan diberi Pas Lawatan (Sosial) sebagai 
pelawat biasa di pintu-p1 ntu masuk dan 
selepas itu akan dilanjutkan selama 
6 bulan lagi. Selepas tempoh tersebut 
dan tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat yang 
dikenakan oleh Ketua Pengarah Imigeresen, 
Pas Lawatan mereka akan dilanjutkan 
dari setahun ke setahun. Isteri-isteri 
a.sing dalam gulongan ini layak memohon 
Penni t Masuk selepas 5 tahun mereka mula 
memasuki negara ini. 
. . 2/-
.. 
Jabatan I~igerese~ secara sere~:a~ c: 
mulai hari Isnin hadapa~ ~~::e ~ada '~ "' •. 
--p ....... . ,_. . _, - ..... - . 
Oleh itu: -
(i) Bagi isteri-::.s:e!"i as.:.:-:~ 1 :::. •• 
Berkahwin sebe_u~ a:a~ :a~a s .: . ·~~-. 
$10/= berst.1·t.:i ce .. ;2.;; sa:...:. .. 2. .• -; -:.~s:2.:. 
Sijil Perkah·,,·:r.a ... 
permo'."lon2r. te!'Seb t . as 2.1:..1:: : .. 
untuk setahur. ak3:, i: -~:.t.~.:·;.;::,.:' . !;" __ .-.:. 
perrnohon3n apabila P::.i.s L3·,; . : .. !1 
telah berkah\,in S<-L 1. _ur :1 :.,.u f.h~., 
.. J/-
(95) 
tetapi telah tinggal berasingan selama 
5 tahun berterusan adalah tidak layak 
mendapat kemudahan di perenggan i(a) 
di atas. 
(ii) Bagi isteri-isteri asing yang 
. 'c?_erkahwin selepas 6. 2. 1980. 
(a) Mereka dalam gulongan ini hcndaklah 
mcmbuat permohonan di Pcjabat-Pejabat 
Imigeresen dalam Borang Resmi dengan 
bayaran sebanyak $10/= berserta 
dengan salinan photootat Sijil Perkah-
winan dan/atau bukti-bukti lain yang 
menunjukkan pcrkahwinan itu tulin. 
Atas penerimaan pennohonan ini, 
Pas Lawatan (Sosial) untuk 6 bulan 
akan dikcluarkan. 
( b) Dalam tcmj::>oh 6 bulan ini pil)dk 
Jabatan Imigerescn akan mencliti 
dokumen-dokwnen yang dik8mukakan 
bagi mempastikan kctulinan pcrkahwinan. 
(c) Selcpas tcmpoh 6 bulan itu, Pas 
Lawatan (Sosial) akan dipcrbaharui 
dari setahun ke setahun jika 
permohonan dibuat. 
. . 4/-
Permohonan bagi pembaharuan hendaklah 
dibuat dalam Borang Rcsmi serta menanda 
tangani auatu Bon. Bonini sebenarnya 
telah di2JTialkan selama ini mengikut 
peruntukan yang terrn3ktub dalam undang-
undang , 
Penggunaan Bonini adalah semata-mata 
bertujuan mempastikan kedudukan isteri 
akan terjamin dan tidak teraniaya sekira 
berlakunya perpisahan , perceraian , atau 
di dapati perkahwinan itu adalah satu 
perkahwinan untuk mcndapat kcmudahan~ 
3 . Istcri-isteri asing yang telah dibsnarkan tinggal 
atas Pas Lawatan (Sosial) dari setahun kc s8tahun 
adalah bebas untuk keluar masuk ncgera ini . Sekiranya 
Pas Lawatan (Sosial) rncrcka itu mati atau habis 
tempohnya se~asa berada di luar negeri, semasa m •0ka 
masuk balik kc negera ini, mereka akan dibcnarkan 
masuk bagi membolchkan mereka memperbaharui Pas Lawatan 
(Scsial) dari sctahun kc set.::ihun di Pejabat Imieerc3cn. 
4. Isteri-isteri asing yang pcrtama kali m~masuki ncgara 
ini, mereka akan diberi Pas Lawatan (Sosial) sebagai 
pelawat biasa di pintu-pintu masuk dan bagi mereka dari 
negara yang perlu visa hendaklah mendapatkan visa sebclum 
memasuki negara ini. Jika mercka berk.::ihwin sebelwn 
.. 5/-
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6hb, Fcbruari 1 1980 1 mereka hendaklah membuat permohonan 
Pas Lawatan (Sosial) dari setahun ke ·setahun mcnurut 
cara-c~ra yang dinyatakan di para 2(i) (a) di atas, 
dan ba~i mereka yang berkahwin selepas 6hb. Februari, 
1980, mercka hcndaklah mcmbuat pcrmohonan menurut 
cara-cara yang dinyatakan di para 2(ii)(~). 
5, Perlu diingatkan di sini bahawa kemudahan ini hanya 
dibcrikan khusus kepada isteri-isteri asing yang 
pcrkahwinannya masih ujud dan masih kekal sehagai 
seorang isteri. 
Kemudahan ini akan ditarik balik sekiranya isteri-
istcri asing itu tclah berpisah atau bercerai dengan 
suaminya atau jika di dapati perkahwinan mereka itu 
tidak tulin, 
Dikeluarkan olch 
Jabatan Imigcrcsen Malay3ia, 
Kuala Lumpur. 
28hb, November, 1981. 
(98) 
FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER ONE 
1. I would not be able to produce this paper without the necessary basic 
essential materials like the 1976 Act and the like had it not been 
for the kind assistance of Mr K. s. Dass, an Advocate and Solicitor, 
High Court of Malaya, who promptly posted those materials to me from 
Malaysia upon request, to whom I am most truly obliged. My special 
gratitude is also recorded to the Government of Malaysia for their 
financial support. For their understanding and moral support, I 
would also like to take this opportunity to thank Bada and Azlan. 
CHAPTER TWO 
1. J.S. Mackenzie in his book "Fundamental Problems of Life - An Essay 
on Citizenship as Pursuit of Value," (Allen & Unwin, The MacMillan Co., 
London, 1928), argued human wants or needs in pursuit of values 
are always aimed at what can be called as "goodness" to achieve what 
a man considers are best for him and possibly his family which affect 
his choice. It is therefore submitted that, marriage and citizenship 
are two examples of such choices. Freedom of association, one of 
the fundamental ri911Ls of a citizen, includes the freedom of choice 
to marriage. 
2. A's family may know B's family very well. As such, both A and B 
know each other. However, not known to either A or B, there may be 
family arrangement to have them married to each other in order to 
foster closer relationship between the two said families . As the 
result of the arrangement, A was later married to B. 
In the alternative, A by his own free will may decide to be 
engaged to B with the consent and blessings of both the families. 
While being so engaged lo B, A may come to know C. Contrary to A's 
choice of knowing C, he fell in love with Cat first sight and decided 
to marry C instead. 
Either of the above examples, it is sulJmitted, can be considered 
more of a fate rather than the exercise of A's true choice. 
(99) 
3. Example, Citizenship Act 1977, provides the law affecting New 
Zealand citizens. 
4. Formed on 16 September 1963 vide L.N.214/1963. It was formerly 
known as "The Federation of Malaya", otherwise also known as 
"Malaya" or "Federation", consisting of eleven states. They are 
Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Penang 
(including Province Wellesley), Perak, Perlis, Selangor and 
Trengganu. 
On formation of Malaysia, the states of Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore were incorporated into the Federation. On 9 August 1965, 
by section 3 of the Constitution and Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) 
Act 1965 (No.53), Singapore ceased to be one of the states of the 
Federation. The words "states of Sabah and Sarawak" were substituted 
for the words "Borneo States" with effect from August 27, 1976 by the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1976 (No. A354) s.43. 
The people of Malaysia are called Malaysians. 
5. The "Sultans" are the Malay Rulers of each state in West Malaysia 
except Malacca, Penang and Negri Sembilan. In Negri Sembilan, he 
is styled as "Yang DiPertuan". In the states of Malacca and Penang 
(West Malaysia) and Sabah and Sarawak (East Malaysia), the Heads 
of the states are known as "Yang DiPertuas" (formerly known as 
"Governors"). They are appointed in accordance with section 19A(l) 
of the Eight Schedule of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia -
Reprint No.2 of 1979, (incorporating all ame .. uments up to 1 May 1977, 
(hereafter I will only refer to it as "the Constitution"). 
6. Article 32(1) of the Constitution. 
7. Ibid, Art. 3(1). 
8. Later, the title "Megat" was changed to "Sultan". 
9. Also spelt as "Moslem". 
10. Rubber (Hevea brasiliensis) was introduced to Singapore Botanical 
Garden from Brazil by Henry Ridley in 1876 . 
11. Prior to that, the said issue was never really raised wiLh full force 
since it must have been considered not that important. That, it is 
submitted can be easily explained , since the concentraLion of those 
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irrunigrants was for the accumulation of wealth rather than legal 
status affecting citizenship matters. 
12. Vide G.N. 6/5-2-48. 
13. Is dealt with Part XII of the 1948 Agreement. 
14. Ibid, s.124(3) (b) which defined "Malay" as a person who habitually 
speaks Malay, professes the Muslim religion and conforms to Malay 
customs. 
15. Was a Crown Colony. So far as Malaysia is concerned, the states 
involved were: (a) Penang (1786) when Francis Light took possession 
of Penang Island; (b) Province Wellesley (1800) by agreement between 
the Sultan of Kedah, Sultan Diyanddin Mukarram Syah and Lieutenant-
Governor Sir George Leith; (c) By the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 
it provided for the cessation of Malacca to Great Britain and 
recognized Singapore as a British possession; and (d) Labaun (in 
the North Borneo states) in 1881. When the Japanese had been 
returned to Japan, after a brief period of British military 
administration the civilian government was drastically reorganized 
in 1946 and later the colony of the Straits Settlements affecting 
Malaysia was disbanded. 
16. When Singapore was one of the states of Malaysia (see footnote (4) 
above), Her citizens were also citizens of Malaysia. When she 
ceased to be part of Malaysia on 9 August 1965 (Singapore Day), Her 
citizens too ceased to be Malaysian citizens by virtue of section 12 
of the 1965 Act (No.53). Dual citizenship was therefore, it is 
submitted, recognised by Malaysia for a short period during the 
brief Singapore's union with the Federation but only affecting 
Singapore citizens and not citizens of other states. 
17. Vide L.N. 214/1963. 
18. Article 18(1) of the Constitution. 
19. P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law 
(2 ed. Sijthoft and Noordhaff - 1979). 
20. P. Weis, op.cit., p.5. 
(101) 
21. Cheshire and North, Private International Law (10 ed. Butterworth - 1979) 
p.183. 
22. P. M. Bromley and P.R.H. Webb, Family Law, (N.Z. ed., Wellington, 
Butterworth - 1974). 
23 . P. Weis, op.cit. pp.161-169, stated that "statelessness" is not 
inconsistent with international law since international law could 
not impose a duty to confer their nationality. That being the 
situation, he further pointed out that the states are thus free to 
prescribe rules. Under the "conflict rules" which can either be 
"Absolute" (at birth) or "Relative" (subsequent to birth), a person 
may be stateless without acquiring another. In general, the states 
may impose rules based on their own legal system and sometjmes may 
also be political considerations and demographical reasons. 
24. Articles 16(b) and 16A(b) of the Constitution. 
25. Ibid, art. 19 (1) (a) (i). 
26. Press Statement of the Malaysian Immigration Deparbnent, Malaysia 
(in Malay language) dated 28 November 1981. It concerns foreign 
wives married to Malaysian citizens. See Appendix (D). 
CHAPTER THREE 
1. Ahmad.Ibrahim, "Law and Population in Malaysia", Law and 
Population - Monograph Series no . 45. (1977) at p.28. 
2. It was held that Ceylon Tamil Hindus follow a monogamous form 
of customary marriage (see Ahmad Ibrahim, op. cit. at p . 28). 
3. Besides the Malays, there are also Chinese and Indian Malaysian 
citizens who are Muslims. Their marriages too are being regulated 
by Islamic law of marriage as applied to Malay Malaysian citizens . 
4. It is submitted that consent in Chinese customary law based on the 
above discussion is similar to canon law consent before the church 
intervened. The basic essential under both, is a mere consent lo 
be married to each other. There is no need, under canon l..iw of any 
ceremony though it must be in the present tense. However, if it is .tn 
(102) 
the future tense, the marriage is still valid if there is an 
immediate follow up of sexual relationship between the couple 
concerned, since in such a situation, consent was implied. 
(See S. M. Cretney, Principle of Family Law (3 ed. - Sweet and 
Maxwell) at pp. 6-8). 
5. In the case of Mary Ng & Anor. v. Ooi Gim Teong (1972] 2 M.L.J. 1 8 , 
at p .19, Mohamed Azmi J. s ,1.id, "Having regards to the experience 
and qualifications of Mr Lee Siow Mong, I accept him as an expert 
witness and I accept his evidence ... [in] Chinese customary law ... " 
6. Lee Siow Mong, "Chinese Customary Marriage and Divorce", 
[1972] 2 M.L.J. (iii) at p. (iv). 
7. Under the General Code of Laws (Ta Ching Lu Li) which according 
to Mr Lee Siow Mong, appeared in 1740 in 47 volumes. For furth e r 
discussion of how the General Code of Laws came about, see Lee Siow 
Mong, op.cit., at p. (iii). 
8. Ibid, at p. (iv) foot-note (2). 
9. Ahmad Ibrahim, op.cit., at p.28. 
10. Iman Newsletter 1, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982, at p.10. 
11. Also spelt as "Kadi" , "Kadee", or "Cadi" (see The Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary, on Historical Principles, prepared by 
William Little, H. W. Fowler and J Coulson, 3 e d. Vol. l A-M, 
at p.246). 
12. [1866] L.R. l P & D 130. 
13. Ibid, at p.133. 
14. Example, all Portuguese at Portuguese s e ttleme nts in Malacca are 
Christian by religion. There are also Chines e and Indian Malaysian 
citize ns who are christians. 
15. Similar provisions are provided in respect of Malaysian Christian 
citizens (as well as non-citizens) of Sabah and Sarawak by 
Christian Marriage Ordinance 1919 (Sabah Cap. 24) and Churc h and 
Marriages Ordina nces (Sarawak Cap. 92) respective l y . 
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16. It is submitted that one of the most important practical and useful 
effects of facilitating such marriages will reduce the Civil Marriage 
Registry of being congested with applications for marriage licences. 
17. Detailed provisions concerning the requirement of parental consent 
and the prohibition of marriage between persons who come within 
prohibited degrees of affinity prescribed therein are similar to 
those of English Law. Marriageable ages for male and female are 
16 and 14 respectively, except Sarawak which is 14 for both male 
and female by virtue of (a) Civil Marriages Ordinance 1952 and 
Christian Marriage Ordinance 1956 for West Malaysia, (b) Marriage 
Ordinance 1959 (applicable to all marriages in Sabah) for Sabah 
and (c) Church and Civil Marriages Ordinances (Sarawak Cap. 92) 
for Sarawak. 
18. Lee Siow Mong, op.cit. at p. (iv). 
19. £1972] 2 M.L.J. 18. 
20. Ibid, at p.20. However, Kenneth K.S. Wee, though recognising the 
need for expert evidence in such cases, doubted whether Lee Siow 
Mong was qualified to speak of Chinese divorce custom of Malaya. 
He based his argument, inter alia, of what Murray-Anysley J. said 
in the case of Woon Ngee Yew v. Ng Yoon Thai [194]] M.L.J. Rep. 32 
at pp.33-34, when his Lordship said, "But whatever the position as 
regards divorce may have been in China it by no means follows that 
the custom of China as it existed under the Manchu dynasty is 
suitable for the Chinese population of Perak today." - Kenneth 
K.S. Wee, "Chinese Law and Malayan Society", [1973) 15 Mal. L.R. 
at pp.111-112. Professor Ahmad Ibrahim (see op.cil. al p.38), 
seems to agree with what Mohamed Azmi J. had concluded based on t..he 
evidence of Lee Siow Mong. Thus, it is submitted lhat, until there 
is judgement to the contrary or judgement of higher Court (Federal 
Court of Malaya), then it must be taken that the present state of 
law with regard to Chinese customary divorce is as what Mohamed 
Azmi J. said. 
(104) 
21. Each state in Malaysia has its own Islamic Enactment(s) on 
Administration of Islamic law in that state. Examples, 
sections 126-128 of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 
Johore 1978 (No.14 of 1978) deal with matters of divorces of 
Muslims in the Johore state while Part VI sections 36 and 37A 
of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, Sabah 1977 (No.15 
of 1977) deal with both marriages as well as divorces of Muslims 
in Sabah. The law relating to marriages and divorces of Muslims 
in Sarawak is to be found in the Muslim Marriage Ordinance (Cap. 75 
of the 1948 Edition) which has not been revised since. Kedah 
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1962, Trengganu Administration 
of Islamic Law Enactment 1955 are another two such examples. 
22. Unilateral pronouncement of divorce by the husband to his wife 
or wives either orally or in writing. 
23. Period of reconciliation. 
24. Reconciled by revocation of the "talak". 
25. Divorce Ordinance 1952 (No.74 of 1952). 
26. Divorce Ordinance 1963 (Sabah No.7 of 1963) 
27. Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Sarawak Cap. 94). 
28. How e ver, if a Chinese couple who are first marri e d unde r the Chine se 
customary law subsequently re-married under Civil Marriage Ordinanc e 
1952 (No.44 of 1952) as discussed above, the provision will also 
apply to them. 
29. Other than marriages under Christian Marriage Ordinance 1956 
(No.33 of 1956) for West Malaysia, Christian Marriage Ordinance 1919 
(Sabah Cap.24) for Sabah and Church and Civil Marriages Ordinances 
(Sarawak Cap .92) of Sarawak, both Christians and non-Christi ans 
(exc ept Muslims) can still contract monogamous marriages at th e 
Civil Registry, for example, under Civil Marriage Ordinance 10 52 
(No.44 of 1952). 
30. Ahmad Ibrahim, op.cit. at pp. 38-39 . 
31. Ibid, at p.37. 
32. See s. 3 (3) of the Act. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
1. I used the word "citizen" here to refer to those who are Malaysian 
citizens either by the operation of law or by registration (other 
than the foreign wives of the citizens) or by naturallsation as 
opposed to a foreign citizen who later acquired Malaysian citizenship. 
Such citizens are the Chinese, Indians, Malays and other Malaysians 
such as the Portuguese (at Malacca Portuguese Settlement) and 
Eurasian Malaysians. 
2. For reason(s) known best to those concerned, it would seem that 
some of the Malaysian non-Malay citizens have been indoctrinated 
to treat themselves as such. This is a major political concern in 
Malaysia which the past and present Governments was and is trying 
to overcome mainly through education. Their feelings, it is 
submitted, are completely unfounded but are basically due to their 
historical ignorance and possibly lack of knowledge of legal 
history which has shaped the present legal system of Malaysia. 
The brief historical background of Malaysian citizenship law 
in Chap. 2, it is hoped will help to undo that unjustifiable and 
unfounded attitude. 
3 . See n . ( 21) of Chap . 3 . 
4. Examp·les, s. 3 ( 3) of the 1976 Act, states, "This Act shall not 
apply to a Muslim ... married under Muslim law ... ;" s . 25 pt.III 
of the Civil Law Act 1976 (Revised 1972), on matters of "disposal 
and devolution of property " does not affect those that are disposed 
in accordance with Muslim law; s.1(2) of the I~1 ritance (Family 
Provisions) Act 1971, specifically exclude the ~pplication of the 
same to Muslims; s . 3(1) of Legitimacy Act 1961 (Revised 1971) and 
s.31 of the Adoption Ordinance 1952 also have the same effect. 
5. Applicable in West Malaysia. 
6. Applicable in Sarawak, East Malaysia. 
7. Applicable in Sabah, East Malaysia . 
8. See notes 24-26 of Chap. 3. 
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9. (1972] 2 M.L.J. 18. 
10. See Lee Siow M:lng, op.cit. at p.(iv) et.seq. and the comment on 
the said case by Kenneth K.S. Wee, op.cit. pp.111-113. 
ll . [ 19 7 2] 2 M. L . J . 18 at p. 20 . 
12. Kenneth K.S. Wee, op.cit. p.110. 
13. Ibid, at p.113. 
14. (1972] 2 M.L.J. at p.20. 
15. K~nneth K.S. Wee, op.cit., at p.113. 
16. Lee Siow Mong, op.cit., at p.(iv). 
17. See notes (29) and (30) of Chap.3. 
18. Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, s.2(1), 
where "natives" has the same meaning assigned to it in cl. 6 art. 161A 
of the Constitution. 
19. Ibid, s.2(1), is as defined by s.3 of the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 
which include "semang" and "sakai" (as examples. 
20. Ibid, s.3(4) - for "natives" they are governed by their native 
customary laws while the "aborigines" by the aboriginal customs. 
21. Ibid., ss.9-12. 
22. Ibid., ss.13-21. 
23. Ibid.,ss.22-26. 
24. Ibid., s. 26 ( 2) . 
25. Ibid., s.7. 
26. Ibid., s.43. It provides that no prosecuLion for an offence 
punishable under this Act shall be instituted except with the 
authority in writing of the Public Prosecutor. 
27. Ibid., s.4(1). 
28. Ibid., s.4(2). 
29. section 494 of the Penal Code by virtue of s.7, ibid. 
30. Il972] 2 M.L.J. 18; the same applies to Chinese customary divorce. 
(107) 
31. Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 , s . 22 (1 ) (a) . 
3 2 . lb id , S • 2 2 ( 1 ) ( C ) • 
33 . Ibid , s . 22 (1)(b) . 
34 . Ibid , s . 24 (1) which deals with solemnisation of a marriage through 
religious ceremony , c ustom or usage . 
35 . Ibid , s . 2 ( 1 ) . 
36 . Ibid , s . 12 (1 ) . 
37 . Ibid , ss . 10 and 12(1) . 
38 . Ibid , s . 38 . 
39 . (19 72] 2 M. L .J. 19 , obite r of Mohamed Azmi J , at p . 20 . 
40 . Law Re f o rm (Marr iage and Di vorce ) Act 1976 , s . 53 ( 1) . It is to 
be noted tha t p r i or to this Act , t here was no uniformity (in so 
far as t he grounds are concerned) for divorce petition in Malaysia . 
See notes 24-26 of Chap . 3. 
41 . Ibid , s . 54(2). 
42 . Ibid , s . 58(2) 
43. Ibid, s . 58 ( 3) (b). 
44. Ibid , s .59 (1) . 
45 . Ibid , s . 57 ( 2) . 
46 . Ibid, s . 61(2) (b). 
47 . There is also conflicting provisions under ss.72 and 104 
affecting the validity and recognition of marriages celebrated 
or contracted aborad . 
48 . Ibid , s . 4(2) . 
49 . Ibid , ss . 48 (1) (a) and (b) and 67 (a) and (b) . 
50 . Ibid , s . 50 (1) . 
51 . Wilful refusal of such nature can be argued to amount to such a 
behaviou r which may be justified to conclude Lhclt it would be 
unreasonable to expect the petitioner to live with the respondent 
and thus falls within the definit i on of s . 54(1) (b) , ibid. 
52 . (1980] 1 M. L . J . 10 . 
(108) 
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1. [1972] 2 M.L.J. 18. 
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